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DISRUPTING EDUCATION FEDERALISM
KIMBERLY JENKINS ROBINSON*
ABSTRACT
The ongoing expansion of federal influence over education in the
United States provides a particularly salient time to consider how
education federalism should be structured to achieve the nation's
educationgoals. One of the nation's unfulfilled andyet essential education
goals is to ensure that all students receive equal access to an excellent
education. A variety of scholars and, most recently, the federal Equity and
Excellence Commission have offered proposals for advancing this goal.
By building on this growing momentum for reform, I argue that disrupting
the nation's longstanding approach to education federalism-which I
define as the balance of power between federal, state, and local
governments that emphasizes substantialstate autonomy over educationis necessaryfor a successful national effort to achieve this goal. I then
provide a foundational theory for strengthening the federal role in
education by analyzing the essential elements of a successful reform effort
based upon research regarding the strengths of federal education
policymaking and upon identification of the missing elements of current
reforms. Finally, I respond to many of the potential arguments against
disrupting education federalism. For instance, I argue that National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius continues to provide
ample room for Congress to expand the federal role in education in ways
that are needed to build a more equitable education system. I also explain
that although strengthening the federal role in education will reduce some
forms of state and local control over education, it also will provide states
and localities new forms of control.

* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. I am thankful for the insightful
comments from Margaret Bacigal, Tara Casey, Jessica Erickson, Jim Gibson, Meredith Harbach, Joyce
Janto, William Koski, Corinna Lain, Martha Minow, Daniel Murphy, Eloise Pasachoff, Wendy
Perdue, James Ryan, and Kevin Walsh. I also received excellent research assistance from Nick
Dantonio, Adam Pratt, Jon Phenix, and Kathleen Travis. Many thanks also to Dean Wendy Perdue for
her support of research assistance for this project.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States continues to tolerate a longstanding educational
opportunity gap. Today, it relegates at least ten million students in lowincome neighborhoods and millions more minority students to poorly
performing teachers, substandard facilities, and other inferior educational
opportunities.' This occurs in part because the United States invests more
money in high-income districts than in low-income districts, a sharp
contrast to other developed nations.2 Scholars and court decisions also
have documented the sizeable intrastate disparities in educational
opportunity.' In addition, interstate inequalities in educational opportunity
represent the largest component of disparities in educational opportunity.4
The harmful nature of interstate disparities falls hardest on disadvantaged
schoolchildren who have the most educational needs,' and states do not

1. EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM'N, FOR EACH AND EVERY CHILD: A STRATEGY FOR
EDUCATION EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE 14 (2013).
2. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REMEDIAL EDUCATION: FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY 4

(2013).
3. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 667 (N.Y. 1995); Tenn. Small
Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 91 S.W.3d 232, 234-35 (Tenn. 2002); WAYNE AU, UNEQUAL BY DESIGN:
HIGH-STAKES TESTING AND THE STANDARDIZATION OF INEQUALITY 140 (Michael W. Apple ed.,
2009); JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, Two SCHOOLS, AND THE
STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICAN 127 (2010); Goodwin Liu, Interstate

Inequality in Educational Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2044, 2068 (2006).
4. Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 332
(2006); see also BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., EDUC. LAW CTR., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL
REPORT CARD 11-12 tbl. 2 (3d ed. 2014) (showing per pupil state expenditures on elementary and
secondary education).

5. Liu, supra note 4, at 333-34.
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possess the resources and capacity to address the full scope of these
disparities.6 Furthermore, research confirms that as the gap in wealth has
grown between low-income and high-income families, the achievement
gap between children in low-income and high-income families also has
widened.
Although equal educational opportunity remains a central goal of the
U.S. education system, it has never been realized.8 Indeed, the United
States relies heavily on schools to overcome the influence of a child's
circumstances, such as family income and structure, on life opportunities
despite evidence that schools are not effectively serving this function. 9
Fulfilling the goal of equal educational opportunity will become
increasingly important to the nation's interests given research that reveals
that the United States will need more highly skilled workers to fill jobs
that meet the economy's demands. This research also indicates that the
achievement gap must be closed to ensure that students from rapidly
growing minority communities possess the educational skills necessary to
contribute to the economy.'o
The nation's approach to education federalism-which I define as a
balance of power between the federal, state and local governments that
emphasizes substantial state autonomy over education-has played a
significant and influential role in undermining federal reforms that have
attempted to address disparities in educational opportunity." In a recent
article, I examined how the nation's approach to education federalism
served as one of the principal obstacles to three of the most comprehensive
federal attempts to advance equal educational opportunity: school
desegregation, federal school finance litigation, and the No Child Left

6. Richard Rothstein, New FederalRoles in Education, in THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL ROLE
IN ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUCATION 37, 39 (2001); Liu, supra note 4, at 333-34; Liu, supra

note 3, at 2082-85, 2089.
7. GREG J. DUNCAN & RICHARD J. MURNANE, RESTORING OPPORTUNITY: THE CRISIS OF
INEQUALITY AND THE CHALLENGE FOR AMERICAN EDUCATION 1-2 (2014); Sean F. Reardon, The
Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between the Rich and the Poor: New Evidence and Possible
Explanations, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?: RISING INEQUALITY, SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN'S LIFE
CHANCES 91, 91 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Mumane eds., 2011) [hereinafter WHITHER
OPPORTUNITY?].
8. MICHAEL A. REBELL & JESSICA R. WOLFF, MOVING EVERY CHILD AHEAD: FROM NCLB
HYPE TO MEANINGFUL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 13 (2008).
9. See DUNCAN & MURNANE, supra note 7, at 2.
10. Thomas Bailey, Implications of EducationalInequality in a Global Economy, in THE PRICE
WE PAY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF INADEQUATE EDUCATION 74, 78-79, 92 (Clive
R. Belfield & Henry M. Levin eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE PRICE WE PAY].

11. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The High Cost of Education Federalism, 48 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 287, 290 (2013).
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Behind Act.1 2 Although some contend that these decisions and results are
driven more by a lack of political will rather than education federalism, 3
the consistency with which federalism has arisen as a real or imagined
obstacle to reforms aimed at ensuring equal educational opportunity
suggests that it is a significant contributing factor even if other factors also
adversely influenced these reforms.
Given this compelling history and the nation's deeply entrenched
educational opportunity gap, I propose a theory for strategically
restructuring and strengthening the federal role in education in the United
States to establish the necessary foundation for a national effort to ensure
equal access to an excellent education. This restructuring and
strengthening of the federal role in education will disrupt the nation's
longstanding approach to education federalism because it would require
shifting the balance of power in education away from the state and local
governments and toward the federal government. The United States would
then need to adopt a new understanding of education federalism that
embraces the federal government as the guarantor of equal opportunity
because it is the only government with the capacity and sufficient
incentive to lead a national effort to achieve this widely supported-yet
persistently elusive-goal. Although this would not require federalizing
the nation's education system as at least one scholar has recommended,14 it
would require acceptance of a larger federal role in education to hold the
states accountable for ensuring that all students receive equal access to an
excellent education.
Throughout this Article, I define equal access to an excellent education
as the opportunity for all students to attend a high-quality school that
enables them to effectively pursue their life goals, to become engaged
citizens, and to develop their abilities to their full potential." Equal access
to an excellent education includes enabling all students to receive "a real
and meaningful opportunity to achieve rigorous college- and career-ready
standards." 6 If the United States pursues equal access to an excellent
education as the primary goal for its education system, it will break the
traditional link between low-income and minority status and inferior

&

12. Id. at 297-307, 309-14, 323-30. The Equity and Excellence Commission also noted that
local control of education has hindered efforts to promote educational equity. See EQUITY
EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supra note 1, at 34.

13. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization ofEducation, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, Ill
(2004).
14. See Thomas Kleven, FederalizingPublicEducation, 55 VILL. L. REV. 369, 407 (2010).
15. See Robinson, infra note 37, at 1712.
16.

EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supra note 1, at 12.
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educational opportunities.17 This goal recognizes that educational
opportunities should be tailored to meet the individual needs of students
that may vary dramatically depending on a variety of factors, including
family structure and stability, students' health and nutrition, and
neighborhood climate.' 8 This goal also embraces closing opportunity gaps
as an essential prerequisite for closing achievement gaps.' 9 Incentivizing
and embracing racially and economically diverse schools is essential for
achieving this goal because of compelling research regarding the harms of
racial and class isolation, the benefits of diversity, and evidence that
diverse schools provide important educational benefits that cannot be
duplicated by alternative reforms.20 An excellent education for all
schoolchildren should be the nation's ultimate education goal because all
families ultimately want a first-rate education for their children and the
United States would benefit economically, socially, and politically from
providing such an education.
I contend that both the executive branch and Congress can significantly
restructure and expand their authority over education under the Spending
Clause even though the United States Supreme Court, for the first time,
has placed limitations on Spending Clause legislation in National
Federation ofIndependent Business v. Sebelius.2 1 As Part III explains, the
broad parameters established by the Court for Spending Clause legislation
in the decision would provide Congress and the executive branch ample
room to take action that would strengthen federal authority over education
in ways that would not run afoul of the Constitution. In reaching this
conclusion, I agree with other scholars who contend that for the Court to
find a statute unconstitutional in the future, a statute would need to include

17. Janice Petrovich, The Shifting Terrain of Educational Policy: Why We Must Bring Equity
Back, in BRINGING EQUITY BACK: RESEARCH FOR A NEW ERA IN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL POLICY 3,

12 (Janice Petrovich & Amy Stuart Wells eds., 2005) [hereinafter BRINGING EQUITY BACK].
1 8. See Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Mumane, Introduction: The American Dream, Then and
Now, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 7, at 3, 15; REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 30-33.
19. See LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD AND EDUCATION: How AMERICA'S
COMMITMENT TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE OUR FUTURE 73-74 (2010).
20. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, in THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL
INTEGRATION: SOCIOECONOMIC DIVERSITY AS AN EDUCATION REFORM STRATEGY 1, 3 (Richard D.

Kahlenberg ed., 2012); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral Efforts
to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L.
REv. 277, 327-36 (2009); GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, WHY SEGREGATION MATrERS:
POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY 7 (2005); RYAN, supra note 3, at 278-80.

21.

132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606-07 (2012) (plurality opinion) (the Medicaid expansion that required

states to insure anyone under age 65 with an income of less than 133 percent of the federal poverty line

was unconstitutionally coercive in violation of the Spending Clause); see id. at 2664-67 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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each of the factors that the plurality found troubling in National
Federation of Independent Business rather than any one of those factors in
-22
isolation.
My theory for disrupting education federalism is particularly timely for
two reasons. First, the United States is undergoing an unprecedented
expansion of the federal role in education and an accompanying shift in its
approach to education federalism. The American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009,23 also known as the stimulus bill, authorized an
unprecedented $100 billion to invest in education funding, tuition tax
credits, and college grants which President Obama trumpeted as "the
largest investment in education in our nation's history."2 4 The stimulus bill
included $4.35 billion for the Race to the Top (RTTT) program, which
represented far more discretionary finding than all of Secretary of
Education Arne Duncan's predecessors. 25 Although RTTT has its
shortcomings,26 it has sparked significant education reform, including
greater state support for the common core standards, charter schools, and
revisions to state laws regarding the use of student testing data to evaluate
27
teachers. In a number of states and districts, the two years following the
22. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principleand the Spending Clause After NFIB,
101 GEO. L.J. 861, 871 (2013); Eloise Pasachoff, ConditionalSpending after NFIB v. Sebelius: The
Example ofFederalEducation Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 594 (2013).
23. Pub. L. No. 111-5; 123 Stat. 115.
24. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President and the
Vice President at a Meeting with Nation's Mayors (Feb. 19, 2009) (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the
press office/Remarks-by-the-President-and-Vice-President-at-Meeting-with-Nations-Mayors/); see Sam
Dillon, For Education Chief Stimulus Means Power, Money and Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at
Al; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Duncan Hails Passage of President's Stimulus Package, Cites
"Historic Opportunity to Create Jobs and Advance Reform" (Feb. 18, 2009) (http://www.ed.gov/news/
press-releases/duncan-hails-passage-presidents-stimulus-package-cites-historic-opportunity-crea,

archived

at http://perma.cc/3JCZ-86NS).
25. See Race to the Top Fund: Notice of Final Priorities, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,688 (Nov. 18, 2009);
Grover Whitehurst, Panel Remarks, A Discussion with Secretary of Education Arne Duncan (May 11,
http://www.brookings.edu/-/medialevents/2009/5/1 I educationduncan/20090511 education
2009),
transcript corrected.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6PKF-D47S.
26. See, e.g., Jamie Gullen, Note, Colorblind Education Reform: How Race-Neutral Policies
PerpetuateSegregation and Why Voluntary Integration Should Be Put Back on the Reform Agenda, 15

U. PA. J. L. & Soc. CHANGE 251, 264-65 (2012) (arguing that RTTT does not benefit many children
who need education reform and funding and that children in losing states will be omitted from the
reforms that it incentivizes); Patrick McGuinn, Stimulating Reform: Race to the Top, Competitive
Grants and the Obama Education Agenda, 26 EDUC. POL'Y 136, 143-47 (2012) (noting some of the

implementation challenges for RTTT, including the absence of new enforcement tools for the U.S.
Department of Education and political opposition to the reforms).
27. See Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO.

WASH. L. REV. 92, 146 (2013); McGuinn, supranote 26, at 143-47.
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creation of RTTT sparked more reform than those locations had seen in
the preceding twenty years. 28
The stimulus bill built on the substantial expansion of the federal role
in education created by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB).29
NCLB represents the most expansive education reform law in the history
of the United States. 30 For example, the law's far-reaching provisions
required annual testing in math and reading in third through eighth grade
and once in grades ten through twelve and periodically in science.3 The
law also instituted public reporting of results of student assessments on the
content of state standards, launched disaggregation of this data for a
variety of student characteristics including race and ethnicity, created
accountability interventions for Title I schools, and set minimum
requirements for highly qualified teachers. 32 Although NCLB also
established a new federal role in education, it did not provide an
accompanying new understanding of education federalism that could help
to guide this role. 3 3 Given congressional failure to reauthorize the law in a
timely manner, the U.S. Department of Education continues to wield this
expansive federal authority through waivers of NCLB requirements if
states will agree to new conditions on the receipt of federal aid.34
Second, my theory is particularly timely given the current national
focus on improving educational performance of poor schoolchildren and
reducing achievement and opportunity gaps. For instance, a 2013 report
from the Equity and Excellence Commission, a panel of education policy
experts convened by President Barack Obama, proposed a variety of far
reaching reforms that would greatly expand federal responsibility for
ensuring equal educational opportunity. 36 Scholars similarly have offered a
variety of thoughtful proposals for how to reduce the opportunity gap that

28.

Mike Johnston, From Regulation to Results: Shifting American Education from Inputs to

Outcomes, 30 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 195,206 (2011).
29. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
30. PATRICK J. MCGUINN, No CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF FEDERAL
EDUCATION POLICY, 1965-2005, at 1, 195 (2006).
31. 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2012).
32. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311, 6319 (2012).
33. See Kamina Aliya Pinder, Federal Demand and Local Choice: Safeguarding the Notion of

Federalism in Education Law and Policy, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 26-27 (2010).
34. David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265,
279-81 (2013).
35. See DAVID K. COHEN & SUSAN L. MOFFITT, THE ORDEAL OF EQUALITY: DID FEDERAL
REGULATION FIX THE SCHOOLS? 10 (2009); RYAN, supra note 3, at 277; EQUITY & EXCELLENCE
COMM'N, supra note 1, at 14.
36. See EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supra note 1, at 34-35.
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would require greatly expanding federal authority over education and
thereby restructuring education federalism. 37
This Article strengthens these calls for reform in three critical ways.
First, it explains why disrupting education federalism is necessary for a
successful national effort to ensure equal access to an excellent education.
Second, it identifies the essential elements for a successful comprehensive
effort to achieve this goal. Finally, it responds to many of the common
arguments against expanding the federal role in education and highlights
the benefits that could be obtained through a restructuring of education
federalism. In so doing, I provide a theory of education federalism for
reforms that seek to reduce achievement and opportunity gaps by
strengthening the federal role in education.38
In offering a theory for how education federalism should be
restructured to strengthen the federal role over education, and thus reduce
reliance on states to ensure equal access to an excellent education, I build
upon Yale Law Professor Heather Gerken's argument that federalism
theory should eschew advancing a single theory for all occasions because
39
"[b]oth in theory and practice .. . there are many federalisms, not one."
She astutely contends that scholars developing and critiquing federalism
theory should consider the appropriate balance of institutional
arrangements for a specific context. 40 Therefore, my theory for how

37. For instance, in a prior work, I developed a collaborative enforcement model for
congressional legislation that would guarantee a federal right to education and that would require
consistent federal oversight and support of state efforts to provide this right. Kimberly Jenkins
Robinson, The Casefor a Collaborative Enforcement Model for a FederalRight to Education, 40 U.C.

DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1715-22 (2007). Education law scholar and now California Supreme Court
Justice Goodwin Liu has argued that Congress should ensure "educational adequacy for equal

citizenship." Liu, supra note 3, at 2049 (italics omitted). Michael Rebell and Jessica Wolff have
proposed greater federal involvement in education that would require a joint federal-state effort to
ensure that all children receive a meaningful educational opportunity and adequate funds for the
education of all at-risk children. See REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 152. Education scholar

be a unique and necessary federal role to
Richard Rothstein recently proposed that "[i]t could ...
equalize per pupil spending between states, with the federal government subsidizing elementary and
secondary education in low-spending states" and that this should represent "a federal role on which
everyone can agree." Rothstein, supranote 6, at 38.

38. "Through its spending power, the federal government is boldly raising its voice in education.
The states have all accepted this federal role, incorporating federal goals into their own education
plans... . The field is thus ripe for new theories of federalism." Benton Martin, An Increased Rolefor
the Department of Education in Addressing Federalism Concerns, 2012 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 79, 80
(footnotes omitted).

39. Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1561 (2012).
40. Heather Gerken insightfully argues that
Federalism debates are best understood not as disagreements over which model to choose but

as disputes over how to strike the right balance between different types of institutional
arrangements. Such debates, however, can only be hashed out in context-domain by domain,
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education federalism should be restructured does not attempt to propose a
federalism theory for other policymaking arenas such as environmental
law or healthcare policy. Instead, it solely proposes a shift in the balance
of federal, state, and local authority in order to strengthen the federal role
in ensuring equal access to an excellent education while preserving the
aspects of state and local autonomy over education that do not undermine
equal access to an excellent education.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I analyzes the current
structure of education federalism and notes the major trends that have
shaped it. It contends that although some praise education federalism for
its numerous benefits, oftentimes these benefits have not been realized.
Part I offers five reasons that the United States should consider
reexamining its longstanding approach to education federalism. Part II
provides my theory for restructuring education federalism that embraces
strengthening federal responsibility and support for ensuring equal access
to an excellent education. Part III responds to some of the possible
critiques of my theory, including an explanation of why I do not
recommend a change in education doctrine and instead look to the
legislative and executive branches to strengthen the federal role in
education.
I. THE CASE FOR REEXAMINING EDUCATION FEDERALISM

This Part describes the trends that have shaped the structure of
education federalism. It also notes some of the benefits that the current
approach to education federalism is supposed to provide. This Part then
offers compelling reasons why the nation should reexamine education
federalism as a means to pursue a national reform agenda to ensure equal
access to an excellent education.
A. The Benefits of the CurrentStructure ofEducation Federalism
Historically, the hallmarks of education federalism within the United
States have been decentralized state and local control over public schools

policymaking arena by policymaking arena. Generic calls for one approach or another simply
cannot do the trick. Shifting the debate along these lines would lead us to focus our attention
on a more productive set of questions. We would spend more of our time analyzing which
flavor of federalism best fits a given context and less time pushing a single theory.
Id. at 1552.
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and a limited federal role. 4 1 The constitutional foundations for this
approach lie in the omission of education from the purview of federal
authority and the Tenth Amendment's reservation of state authority in all
areas that the Constitution does not assign to Congress.42 However,
education federalism has undergone three substantial transformations in
recent decades.
First, the federal role in education has grown exponentially from its
original narrow role. After Brown v. Board of Education,43 Congress
passed several statutes that fostered federal responsibility for equal
educational opportunity, including the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965." In the last two decades, Congress has expanded
the federal role to encourage higher standards and greater accountability
for the education of all children, most recently through NCLB and its
waivers and the RTTT program. Indeed, the current reach of federal
influence in education extends from the classroom to the state capitol.
Second, state control over education has risen substantially over the
last half century or more of school reform. School finance litigation and
reform encouraged centralization of education authority with state officials
who eventually became the primary funders of public schools. 46 States
currently contribute 45.2% of school funding and local government

41. See Carl F. Kaestle, Federal Education Policy and the Changing National Polity for
Education, 1957-2007, in To EDUCATE A NATION: FEDERAL AND NATIONAL STRATEGIES OF SCHOOL

REFORM 17, 17 (Carl F. Kaestle & Alyssa E. Lodewick eds., 2007).
42.

U.S. CONST. amend. X; REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 43.

43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); see
also Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified
as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-09 (2012)); Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 514 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-58 (2012)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2012)); Michael W. Kirst,
Turning Points: A History of American School Governance, in WHO'S IN CHARGE HERE? THE
TANGLED WEB OF SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 14, 22-23 (Noel Epstein ed., 2004) [hereinafter
WHO'S IN CHARGE]; CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ROLE IN EDUCATION:
WHY IT BEGAN & WHY IT'S STILL NEEDED 8-9 (1999).

45. See 20 U.S.C. § 7861(a) (2012); No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110,
115 Stat. 1425 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); Race to the Top Fund: Notice
of Final Priorities, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,668, 59,688 (Nov. 18, 2009); MCGUINN,supra note 30, at 1, 18081, 193-95; Barron & Rakoff, supra note 34, at 279-81.
46. See Paul T. Hill, Recovering from an Accident: Repairing Governance with Comparative
Advantage, in WHO'S IN CHARGE, supra note 44, at 75, 77; Derek Black, Unlocking the Power ofState
Constitutionswith Equal Protection: The First Step Toward Education as a FederallyProtectedRight,

51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1343, 1402-03 (2010); Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47
How. L.J. 705, 730-31 (2004); Kirst, supra note 44, at 27.
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provides 44.6%.47 The federal government provides 10.2% of funds for
education48 and this represents an increase in federal education funding
over the last decade, although not a steady increase. 4 9 The increase in the
state proportion of funding led to an increase in state authority over
schools. 50 State-created standards and tests also have expanded state
influence over the curriculum.'
Finally, the third trend necessarily follows from the first two trends.
The rise in federal and state authority over education has led to a
substantial decrease in local control of schools for the last half century.52
Local authority over education is primarily focused on the daily
administrative responsibilities for running schools. Most local school
boards also may raise funds for public schools through property taxes.54
The nation's current approach to education federalism has been praised
for its ability to reap several benefits. For instance, some find this
approach superior based upon Justice Brandeis's view that state and local
governments may serve as experimental "laboratories" that can help to
solve the nation's economic and social challenges. 55 States and localities
have adopted a diverse array of governance structures for education that
are designed to respond to state and local interests and preferences.5 ' This

47. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: SCHOOL YEAR 2011-12 (FISCAL YEAR 2012), at 2, 4 tbl.

1 (Jan., 2015), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/201430 1.pdf.
48. Id.
49. Regina R. Umpstead, The No Child Left Behind Act: Is it an Unfunded Mandate or a
Promotion of Federal Educational Ideals?, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 193, 201-02 (2008); NAT'L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, Digest of Education Statistics: 2011, tbl. D (May, 2012), http://nces.ed.gov/
programs/digest/dI 1/ch 4.asp, archivedat http://perna.cc/BGN3-C2M5.

50.

See Hill, supra note 46, at 77.

51. See Kirst, supra note 44, at 36-37. For instance, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed an increase
in state standards for student test performance, curricular and program mandates, and behavioral
requirements, such as attendance, homework and discipline. See id at 37.
52. See James E. Ryan, The Tenth Amendment and Other Paper Tigers: The Legal Boundaries of
Education Governance, in WHO'S IN CHARGE, supra note 44, at 42, 60; Michael Heise, The Political

Economy ofEducation Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 125, 131-32 (2006); Kirst, supra note 44, at 32.
53. See Hill, supra note 46, at 78; Ryan, supra note 52, at 57. In addition, school boards are
responsible for such areas as hiring and supervising staff; constructing, acquiring and maintaining
school buildings; acquiring and managing funding; enforcing attendance laws; implementing federal
and state categorical programs and court orders; obtaining and managing vendor contracts; and
transporting students. See Hill, supra note 46, at 78.

54. See Ryan, supra note 52, at 57; Heise, supra note 52, at 130.
55. Heise, supra note 52, at 131 (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); Pinder, supra note 33, at 36.
56.

PAUL MANNA, COLLISION COURSE: FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY MEETS STATE AND LOCAL

REALITIES 12-14 (2011) [hereinafter COLLISION COURSE]; Heise, supra note 52, at 131.
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decentralization also allows state and local governments to adopt a variety
of curricula, teaching, and learning approaches.57
Some also praise the current structure of education federalism for its
ability to produce the most effective outcomes. For example, proponents
of localism, such as legal theory and local government scholar Gerald
Frug, contend that local decision making can produce more effective
policy reforms because those most affected by the decision shape the
reform.58 Others contend that a decentralized approach to education is
more effective at identifying the most successful educational methods
given the existing uncertainties regarding how best to educate children.
Localism also can create an efficient allocation of goods and services. 60
Efficiency results from the ability of local governments to compete for
citizens by offering an attractive array of public services.61 Within
education, when localities offer diverse learning options, some citizens can
shop for the best schools or relocate so that their children can attend
schools that most effectively serves their educational needs.6 2
Additionally, state and local control over education is commended for
its ability to foster greater accountability to citizens. Individuals exert
greater influence over local government policy than federal or state
64
government. Local control can enable parents to become involved in and
influence their child's education and school.6 5 Parents regularly interact
with and monitor their child's school and this involvement can improve
student performance.6 6 This involvement also can foster a stronger
community as parents interact with other parents and their children.67

57. See COLLISION COURSE, supranote 56, at 13.

58. Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1068-69 (1980).
59. See Aaron J. Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495, 518-19
(2010).
60. Erika K. Wilson, Leveling Localism and Racial Inequality in Education Through the No
Child Left Behind Act Public Choice Provision, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 625, 632 (2011) (citing
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocal Expenditures,64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 417 (1956)).
61.

See Tiebout, supra note 60, at 418.

62. Id
63. Heise, supranote 52, at 131.
64.

See Kirst, supranote 44, at 38.

65.
66.
67.

See Saiger, supra note 59, at 519-20; Wilson, supra note 60, at 632-33.
Saiger, supra note 59, at 519-20.
Id at 520.
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Finally, the tradition of local control of education remains an important
value for many within the American public. 6 8 Many view state and local
control over public elementary and secondary education as a central
component of state and local government. 69 While public opinion polls
reveal an increasing comfort with federal involvement in education, the
polls continue to indicate that Americans generally prefer state and local
control over education. 70 This preference influences the avenues for
reconstructing education federalism that I explore. In addition, state and
local authority over education has resulted in diversity in education
governance that influences how the federal government can impact
education.7 1
B. Five Reasonsfor Reexamining Education Federalism
Given these benefits, why should the nation reexamine the structure of
education federalism and consider increasing federal authority over
education as part of a national plan to ensure equal access to an excellent
education? This reexamination is needed for at least five reasons.
1. EducationFederalismDoes Not Consistently Reap Some of the
Benefits It Is Designed to Achieve
Although education federalism undoubtedly reaps some of the benefits
that it is designed to accomplish,72 the current approach does not
consistently yield the benefits that it is supposed to secure. For instance,
education federalism has been praised for its ability to allow the state and
local governments to serve as "laboratories" of reform. However, research
reveals that in the area of school finance reform, most of the changes have
been fairly limited in scope, and that the reliance on property taxes to fund

68.

Kaestle, supra note 41, at 20; Kirst, supra note 44, at 16; COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56,

at I1.
69. Heise, supra note 52, at 131.
70. See Rebecca Jacobsen & Andrew Saultz, The Polls,
Education?, 76 PUB. OPINION Q. 379, 388 (2012).
71.

Trends: Who Should Control

Cf COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 13 (noting that "the diverse institutional terrain on

which federal policy operates" influenced NCLB's impact).
72.

See Shannon K. McGovern, Note, A New Modelfor States as Laboratoriesfor Reform: How

Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1519, 1529-33 (2011); Hill, supra note 46,
at 86 tbl.4-1 (highlighting the comparative advantage of various levels of educational governance);
Kirst, supra note 44, at 38-39 (noting that citizens have greater opportunity to influence policy in their
local school districts).
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schools remains the prevailing method for local funding of schools. This
method has continued despite the Supreme Court's 1973 call for school
finance reform in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez:
The need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have
relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And
certainly innovative thinking as to public education, its methods,
and its funding is necessary to assure both a higher level of quality
and greater uniformity of opportunity. 74
Even when plaintiffs have prevailed in litigation that sought to reform
school finance systems, most states typically have maintained the same
fundamental and unequal structure for school finance.75 Additionally, in a
substantial majority of the states, funding inequities between wealthy and
poor districts and schools persist.76 Only fourteen states provide more

funding to districts with high concentrations of poverty than those with
low concentrations of poverty,77 despite consistent research that lowincome students require more resources for a successful education than
their more affluent peers.78 The 2013 Equity and Excellence Commission
report confirms this lack of additional funding to students who live in high
poverty concentrations and notes that substantial reform is needed
because, apart from a few exceptions, states fail to link their school
finance systems to the costs that they would need to invest to educate all
children in compliance with state standards.79 Given decades of reforms
that have not made consistent and substantial inroads on these challenges,
the states are not serving as effective "laboratories" for school finance
reform.
Education federalism also is supposed to yield an efficient and
effective education system. However, the education system regularly falls

73.

See BENJAMIN MICHAEL SUPERFINE, THE COURTS AND STANDARDS-BASED

EDUCATION

REFORM 123 (2008); Deborah A. Verstegen & Teresa S. Jordan, A Fifty-State Survey of School
Finance Policies and Programs: An Overview, 34 J. EDUC. FIN. 213, 215 (2009); RYAN, supra note 3,

at 153, 171-72.
74. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973).
75. See Marilyn Gittell, The Politics of Equity in Urban School Reform, in BRINGING EQUITY
BACK, supra note 17, at 16, 38; Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Past, Present, and Future of Equal
Educational Opportunity: A Call for a New Theory of Education Federalism, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 427,

437-38 (2012) (reviewing RYAN, supra note 3); Black, supra note 46, at 1371; Robinson, supra note
II, at 318-22.
76. Gittell, supra note 75, at 26; RYAN, supra note 3, at 127.
77. BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., supra note 4, at 17 fig.3 (examining 2011 school expenditure data).

78. RYAN, supra note 3, at 158.
79. EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supra note 1, at 17-18.
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short of achieving these goals.so The substantial percentage of poorly
educated students inflicts substantial costs upon the United States,
resulting in numerous inefficiencies. 8 For example, as I have noted in
prior scholarship, 82 increasing the high school graduation rate could save
the nation between $7.9 and $10.8 billion annually in food stamps,
housing assistance and welfare assistance. The nation forfeits $156
billion in income and tax revenues during the life span of each annual
cohort of students who do not graduate from high school.84 This cohort
also costs the public $23 billion in health care costs and $110 billion in
diminished health quality and longevity.85 By increasing the high school
graduation rate by one percent for men aged twenty to sixty, the nation
could save $1.4 billion each year from reduced criminal behavior.8 6 Given
this research, ineffective schools inflict high costs upon the nation-costs
that it cannot afford as it wrestles with predicted long-term growth in the
deficit and significant, yet declining, unemployment. 87
Local participation in the governance of school districts also is quite
low. The growing federal and state influence over education has led some
scholars to contend that "local control" no longer exists within American
education and, in fact, it has not existed for quite some time. 88 Education
federalism also has led to varying levels of local control for different
communities, with low-income and minority communities oftentimes
experiencing the least local control. In low-income communities,
community participation regularly can yield little influence due to the lack

80. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supranote 19, at 23-26.
8 1. See id.
82. Robinson, supra note 75, at 429-31 (reviewing RYAN, supra note 3).
83.

Jane Waldfogel et al., Welfare and the Costs of Public Assistance, in THE PRICE WE PAY,

supra note 10, at 160, 173. This estimate is based upon ensuring that all students graduate with a high
school degree and one third of dropouts obtain some education beyond high school. See id.
84.

Cecilia Elena Rouse, Consequencesfor the Labor Market, in THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note

10, at 99, 101.
85.

Peter Muennig, Consequences in Health Status and Costs, in THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note

10, at 125, 137.
86.

Enrico Moretti, Crime and the Costs of CriminalJustice, in THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note

10, at 142, 157. Along with early behavioral problems, low educational attainment also can help to
predict later involvement in criminal activity. Greg J. Duncan & Katherine Magnuson, The Nature and
Impact of Early Achievement Skills, Attention Skills, and Behavior Problems, in WHITHER
OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 7, at 47, 63.
87. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2013 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 2-3, 13 (2013); Press

Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation-March 2015 (Apr. 3, 2015)
(http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf), archived at http://perma.cc/LAK5-Y9A5; Dionne
Searcey, Job Growth Failsto Help Paychecks of Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2015, at B 1.
88.

Ryan, supranote 52, at 60; Heise, supranote 52, at 131.

2015]

DISRUPTING EDUCATION FEDERALISM

975

of political power and financial means of residents.89 Low-income citizens
also cannot influence local or state governments to enact favorable policies
and reforms when these governments lack the funds for implementation.90
Parents also do not enjoy an unfettered ability to choose their child's
school. 9 1 Although the quality of schools certainly influences where many
families purchase homes, low-income families typically lack the financial
ability to choose the best schools because such schools are zoned for more
*92
expensive housing options.
Local participation in the governance of school districts also fails to
yield the accountability that it is supposed to secure. Research reveals that
local participation in school board elections and governance can be quite
limited. 93 Typically, no more than ten to fifteen percent of voters
participate in school board elections.94 School board meetings also
oftentimes experience low citizen attendance. 95 Even the structure of many
school board meetings limits public discussion and often public discussion
does not influence board decisions.96 Research also has found that many
who support the concept of locally controlled school boards do not
understand the functions of school boards or support the school boards in
their communities.97
In noting that education federalism does not consistently yield the
benefits that it is designed to secure, I am not suggesting that it does not
yield some important benefits. Certainly, the decentralized nature of the
American education system fosters some state and local experimentation
and innovation, such as curricular reform, teaching innovations, and other
state and local reforms. 98 One need look no further than the effectiveness

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Wilson, supra note 60, at 633.
Id.
Id at 634.
Id
Id. at 633.
See Kirst, supra note 44, at 38.
Wilson, supra note 60, at 633.
Id.

97. See Kirst, supranote 44, at 38.
98. See Henry M. Levin, Multiple "Choice" Questions: The Road Ahead, in WHO'S IN CHARGE,

supra note 44, at 228, 231 (describing the expansion in school choice models from the 1970s through
the 1990s); COUNCIL OF CHIEF STATE SCH. OFFICERS, SCHOOL CHOICE IN THE STATES: A POLICY

LANDSCAPE 9-13 (2013) (analyzing state opportunities to participate in the eleven most common types
of school choice); INST. FOR YOUTH, EDUC. & FAMILIES, NAT'L LEAGUE OF CITIES, EDUCATIONAL
ALIGNMENT FOR YOUNG CHILDREN: PROFILES OF LOCAL INNOVATION 1 (2012) (examining successful
efforts by individual cities to improve educational success by aligning early childhood education with
K-1 2 education programs); Gerard Toussaint Robinson, Can the Spirit of Brown Survive in the Era of

School Choice?: A Legal and Policy Perspective, 45 HOW. L.J. 281, 295-307 (2002) (describing the
growth of charter schools and voucher programs and some of the lawsuits challenging voucher
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of some charter schools against great odds, or community-based reforms
that coordinate and connect the educational, health, and social service
needs of children to find examples of success that have arisen from local
reforms. 99 The current structure of education federalism undeniably fosters
more state and local control and accountability for state and local
decisions than a completely federalized system of education. 00 These
important benefits are worth preserving. However, the inconsistency in
reaping these benefits suggests that it is worth reexamining how education
federalism could be restructured to more reliably secure such benefits.
2. EducationFederalismHas Served as One of Several Important
Roadblocks to Reforms Aimed at EnsuringEqual Educational
Opportunity
As explained in the Introduction, in a 2013 article I analyzed how a
preference for local control and a limited federal role in education have
functioned as one of several critical roadblocks to three of the primary
reforms that promote equal educational opportunity: school desegregation,
school finance litigation in federal court, and NCLB.' For instance, key
Supreme Court decisions, from the 1974 decision in Milliken v. Bradley to
the 1995 decision in Missouri v. Jenkins, relied on the structure of
federalism and the American tradition of local control of education as one
of the reasons for severely curtailing the authority of courts to ensure
effective school desegregation.1 0 2 In so doing, these opinions clung to a
form of dual federalism that required separate spheres for certain
government functions, and thus insisted that education was solely a state

programs); REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 141-43 (describing the effectiveness of Kentucky's
school improvement approach that includes deploying "highly skilled educators" to low-performing
schools).
99. See, e.g., CHRISTINA CLARK TUTTLE ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, KlPP
MIDDLE SCHOOLS: IMPACTS ON ACHIEVEMENT AND OTHER OUTCOMES 32 (2013) (finding in a study

of performance in KIPP (Knowledge Is Power Program) middle schools on reading, math, science and
social studies that "the average impacts of KIPP middle schools on student performance on state

assessments are positive, statistically significant, and educationally meaningful in all academic
subjects we analyzed"); Diana Hall, Schools Uniting Neighborhoods: Community Schools Anchoring
Local Change, COMMUNITY INVESTMENTS, Summer 2012, at 14, 17 (describing outcomes of efforts to

bring together schools and community partnerships in Multnomah County, Oregon, and finding that
"74 percent of students met state benchmarks or growth target in Reading").
100. See Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the

InterfurisdictionalGray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 607, 613 (2007).
101. Robinson, supra note I1, at 287, 297-307, 309-14, 323-30. The Equity and Excellence
Commission also noted that local control of education has been a hindrance to efforts to advance
educational equity. See EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supra note 1, at 34.

102. See Robinson, supranote I1, at 297-304.
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and local function. 03 However, dual federalism had already been
eschewed in prior Court decisions that prohibited segregated educational
systems, and in federal legislation and enforcement that provided
additional federal funding for low-income students and that required equal
educational opportunity for girls, women, disabled students, and English
language students.104
Similarly, the Supreme Court relied upon education federalism as one
of several justifications for rejecting a federal right to education in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 05 The Court noted that
it lacked the expertise to interfere with state and local education judgments
(an objection that did not stop the Court from deciding Brown) regarding
the most effective education reforms and the connection between funding
and educational quality.' 06 The Court's rationale also highlighted the
importance of local control of schools and the values it brings, such as
tailoring programs to students' needs and experimentation.' 07 The Court
insisted that it did not want to disturb the existing balance of power
between the federal and state governments by reaching a decision that
essentially would result in striking down school finance systems
throughout the United States. 08 Thus, the Court's decision privileged
federalism interests over the nation's interest in equal educational
opportunity and insulated school finance disparities from federal judicial
review.' 09
Even when Congress was adopting NCLB, which represents the most
comprehensive education statute aimed at closing achievement and
opportunity gaps, the nation's longstanding approach to education
federalism insisted that states decide the standards for students and
teachers."o This "congressional genuflect to education federalism"
resulted in many states failing to adopt rigorous standards for either
students or teachers."'

103. Id. at 303-04.
104. Id. at 287, 303-04.
105. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 43-44, 49-50 (1973); see also
Robinson, supra note 11, at 309-11.
106. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42-43.
107. See id. at 49-50.
108. See id. at 47-48, 54-55.
109. See Robinson, supra note I1, at 310-11.
110. See COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 41 ("Long-standing political concerns and views
of American federalism, such as the tradition of state and local control of curriculum and teaching,

kept some options such as federally developed standards and tests off the negotiating table from the
start."); Robinson, supra note I1, at 325, 327-28.
111. Robinson, supranote 11, at 326, 328-29; cf COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 30.
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Certainly, education federalism does not stand alone as an obstacle to
these reforms. Numerous other obstacles, including state and local
backlash against court-ordered desegregation,' 1 2 the challenges of courtmandated school reform," 3 and inadequate funding for NCLBll 4 also
undermined the effectiveness of these reforms. Nevertheless, education
federalism was one of the central obstacles to the effectiveness of these
reforms.
3. EducationFederalismShould Be Reexamined Because States Have
Refused to Take the Necessary Comprehensive and Sustained
Action That Is Needed to Ensure Equal Access to an Excellent
Education
Throughout this nation's history-even acknowledging state reforms of
education and school finance-the states have not taken sustained and
comprehensive action to ensure that all students receive equal access to an
excellent education."'5 Redistributive goals and equity concerns are simply
not consistent state priorities for education.1 6 Indeed, the 2013 report from
the Equity and Excellence Commission found that:
[A]ny honest assessment must acknowledge that our efforts to date
to confront the vast gaps in educational outcomes separating
different groups of young Americans have yet to include a serious
and sustained commitment to ending the appalling inequities-in
school funding, in early education, in teacher quality, in resources
for teachers and students and in governance-that contribute so
mightily to these gaps.l1

112. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 149-74 (2007) (discussing state and local resistance and violence in response to school
desegregation orders from federal courts).
113. See, e.g., BENJAMIN MICHAEL SUPERFINE, EQUALITY IN EDUCATION LAW AND POLICY,

1954-2010, at 78-80, 125-26 (2013) (noting the challenge confronting school finance litigation,
including equity litigation that struggled with "definitional problems of the concept of equality, vague
legal requirements, the limited institutional expertise of courts in education, the continuing interplay
between the courts and the political branch of state legislatures, and the sheer lack of knowledge about
how to transform educational funding into educational opportunities consistently").
114. See REBELL& WOLFF, supranote 8, at 99-102.
115. See EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supra note 1, at 14-15, 17-18.
116. See Susan H. Fuhrman, Less than Meets the Eye: Standards, Testing and Fearof Federal
Control, in WHO'S IN CHARGE, supra note 44, at 131, 150; RYAN, supra note 3, at 153, 178.
117. See EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supra note 1, at 14.
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Furthermore, intrastate reforms cannot address significant and harmful
interstate disparities in funding." 8
The limited scope of many reforms also reveals that the United States
has lacked the political will and investments in enforcement to adopt and
implement the type of reforms that would make equal access to an
excellent education a reality.'" 9 Given this generally consistent failure to
undertake comprehensive and sustained reform, the United States should
not expect different results from a system that has failed to ensure equal
educational opportunity for many generations of schoolchildren.120
Instead, an assessment of how education federalism could be restructured
to support a comprehensive national effort to achieve this goal is long
overdue.Part II.F will explain why further expansion of the role of the
federal government as the guarantor of equal opportunity represents a
more fruitful avenue for reform than state level reform.
4. Education Federalism'sInsistence on State andLocal Controlof
School FinanceSystems Invites Inequality
Primary state and local control over education essentially invite
inequality in educational opportunity because of pervasive state insistence
that local governments raise education funds and state funding formulas
that do not effectively equalize the resulting disparities in revenue.121
Although some influential victories have occurred,1 22 school finance
litigation has mostly failed to change the basic organizational structure of
school finance systems and their reliance on property taxes to fund
schools.1 23 Instead, this litigation at best has obtained limited increases in
funding for property-poor districts while allowing property-rich districts to

118. Liu, supra note 4, at 332-33.
119.
120.

EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supranote 1, at 34-35.
RYAN, supra note 3, at 1.

121. See Ryan, supra note 52, at 127-29; Osamudia R. James, Breaking Free of Chevron's
Constraints: Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. U.S. Department of Education, 56 U. KAN. L. REV.
147, 149 (2007).
122. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 11), 575 A.2d 359, 408 (N.J. 1990) ("We find that in order
to provide a thorough and efficient education in these poorer urban districts, the State must assure that
their educational expenditures per pupil are substantially equivalent to those of the more affluent
suburban districts, and that, in addition, their special disadvantages must be addressed."); Campaign

for Fiscal Equity v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995) ("Children are entitled to minimally
adequate physical facilities and classrooms which provide enough light, space, heat, and air to permit
children to learn. Children should have access to minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning such

as desks, chairs, pencils, and reasonably current textbooks. Children are also entitled to minimally
adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, writing, mathematics,
science, and social studies, by sufficient personnel adequately trained to teach those subject areas.").
123. RYAN, supra note 3, at 178.
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maintain the same funding level or to raise their funding rate at a slower
pace.124
Recent evidence of the persistent inequalities in school funding can be
found in two distinct 2013 reports. A report from the Council on Foreign
Relations found that in the United States more is spent per pupil in highincome districts than in low-income districts.1 2 5 This stands in sharp
contrast to most other developed nations where the reverse is true. 12 6 The
Equity and Excellence Commission report also found that "[n]o other
developed nation has inequities nearly as deep or systemic; no other
developed nation has, despite some efforts to the contrary, so thoroughly
stacked the odds against so many of its children." 27 These disparities are
due in substantial part to the continued state reliance on property taxes to
fund schools.1 28 As a result, state school finance systems in the United
States typically create many predominantly low-income and minority
schools that predictably produce poor outcomes because these schools
typically lack both the resources to ensure that their students obtain an
effective education and the capacity to undertake effective reforms even
when these reforms are well conceived.1 2 9
The harms from persistent and pervasive disparities in educational
opportunity are not limited to schoolchildren, their families, and their
communities. These disparities also harm nationwide interests in a strong
economy and a just society. The United States needs to maintain
international academic competitiveness to attract businesses and prevent
the loss of jobs to other more educated nations.1 3 0 Yet, international
assessments reveal that the performance of U.S. students is often average
or below average when compared to other countries,' 3 ' which will make it
difficult for U.S. students to compete successfully against students from
many other nations. The Program for International Student Assessment
(PISA), an international assessment of performance in math, reading and

124. See id. at 153, 178; Black, supra note 46, at 1371; Robinson, supra note 11, at 318-21.
125.

See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supranote 2, at 4.

126. Id.
127. EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supra note 1, at 15.
128. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 4.
129. See ACHIEVE, INC., CLOSING THE EXPECTATIONS GAP: SIXTH ANNUAL 50-STATE PROGRESS
REPORT ON THE ALIGNMENT OF HIGH SCHOOL POLICIES WITH THE DEMANDS OF COLLEGE AND
CAREERS 22 (2011); REBELL & WOLFF,supra note 8, at 163.
130. See Jonathan B. Cleveland, School Choice: American Elementary and Secondary Education
Enter the "Adaptor Die" Environment ofa Competitive Marketplace, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 75, 84
(1995); COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 1.
131. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PERFORMANCE OF U.S. 15-YEAR-OLD STUDENTS IN
MATHEMATICS, SCIENCE, AND READING LITERACY IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: FIRST LOOK AT

PISA 2012, at 9-10 (2013).
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science, was administered in 2012 to students in sixty-five education
systems.1 32 The results showed that the average U.S. student who
participated scored average in reading and science literacy and below
average in math literacy when compared to other countries in the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.1 33 Doctors
Eric A. Hanushek, Paul E. Peterson and Ludger Woessman, professors of
education at Stanford University, Harvard University and the University of
Munich respectively, summarized the lackluster performance of U.S.
students on international assessments in a 2013 book by noting that:
The evidence of international comparison is now clear. American
students lag badly and pervasively. Our students lag behind students
not just in Asia, but in Europe and other parts of the Americas. It is
not just disadvantaged students or a group of weak students who
lag, but also American students from advantaged backgrounds.
Americans are badly underrepresented among the world's highest
achievers.1 34
Although some challenge such conclusions from international assessments
as overblown and simplistic,

35

others conclude that these less than stellar

outcomes indicate that the U.S.education system is failing to prepare many
of its students to compete successfully for jobs with other students from
around the world.1 36
Research reveals that the long-term vigor of the U.S. economy will
depend on the advanced skills that are typically provided in higher
education and that are needed for upper-level technical occupations.' 37
Although the U.S. higher education system historically has been
considered world-class, the United States is facing substantial competition
from other countries with their fast-growing higher education systems.1 3 8

132. See id. at 1.
133. Seeid.at9-10.
134. ERIC A. HANUSHEK, PAUL E. PETERSON & LUDGER WOESSMANN, ENDANGERING
PROSPERITY: A GLOBAL VIEW OF THE AMERICAN SCHOOL vii (2013). The authors further comment,
"While there are issues of measurement that warrant further examination and there are some apparent
differences across subject area, the overwhelming fact of weak academic achievement among

American youth can no longer be in dispute." Id.
135. See MARTIN CARNOY & RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, WHAT Do
INTERNATIONAL TESTS REALLY SHOW ABOUT U.S. STUDENT PERFORMANCE? 2 (2013).
136. See Richard A. Epstein & Jacob E. Gersen, UnderstandingEducation in the United States.

Its Legal and Social Implications, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 467, 467 (2012); EQUITY & EXCELLENCE
COMM'N, supranote 1, at 14-15.

137. Bailey, supra note 10, at 74, 78-79.
138. See id.
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As Thomas Bailey, Teachers College professor of economics and
education, has summarized in his research:
Occupational forecasts, analyses of job content, trends in wages,
and changes in international competition all point to an increasing
need in the United States for workers with high-level skills.
Achieving increases in skill levels will be difficult as long as current
gaps in educational attainment based on income, race, and ethnicity
remain.' 39
In this environment, the U.S. economy and its competitiveness will be
increasingly hindered by low college enrollment and completion rates for
Hispanic and African American students who increasingly will make up a
larger share of the workforce.1 40 Many U.S. students cannot compete
successfully with students from other developed countries, and the lower
achievement of U.S. students could cause comparatively slow growth for
the U.S. economy in the years to come.141
The nation also has a strong interest in ensuring that entire segments of
the American public are not foreclosed from the American dream due to
their family income and racial and ethnic background. The principle of
equal opportunity remains an enduring value within American society 42
even though that value has never been fully realized. Rather than abandon
the interest in equal opportunity, the nation must explore how this value
can become a reality for the nation's schoolchildren. In Part II I propose
some innovative ideas on how to accomplish this goal by restructuring
education federalism.
5. EducationFederalismShould Be Guided by Research Rather than
Primarily by Education Politics
A reexamination of education federalism is needed because the
expansion of the federal role in education has largely been guided by
politics.1 4 3 Politics, indisputably, will continue to play an influential role in
education reform. Nevertheless, I propose a theory for how the expanding
federal role in education should be guided by rigorous research regarding

139. Id. at 92.
140. See id. at 92-93.
141. See EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supra note 1, at 12-13.
142. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., TRENDS IN POLITICAL VALUES AND CORE ATTITUDES: 1987-

2009, at 56 (2009) ("Nearly nine-in-ten (87%) agree that: 'Our society should do what is necessary to
make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed."').
143. See Kaestle, supranote 41, at 17; RYAN, supra note 3, at 14.
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the strengths of federal policymaking, just as research about the
importance of educational opportunities for disabled students informed
Congress's passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975.'" Although federal education law and policy is also influenced by
politics, the federal government has demonstrated a willingness to
leverage politics and research to address the needs of the disadvantaged
within American society when politics has prevented effective reform at
the state and local levels.1 4 5
II. A THEORY FOR DISRUPTING EDUCATION FEDERALISM
Education federalism should be restructured to embrace greater federal
leadership and responsibility for a national effort to provide equal access
to an excellent education. This Part recommends the key elements for
strengthening the federal role in education to accomplish this goal. It
identifies new federal responsibilities that should be undertaken and
recommends reforms of existing federal education policy that would
facilitate this goal. Any substantial strengthening and reform of the federal
role in education will transform the nature of education federalism because
substantive changes to federal authority over education directly affect the
scope of state and local authority over education. These shifts in education
federalism have occurred throughout U.S. history, including federally
mandated school desegregation,1 46 NCLB,1 47 and, most recently, waivers
to NCLB.148
In proposing the essential elements for a national effort to ensure equal
access to an excellent education, I offer a broad theory to guide future
reform by Congress, the executive branch, or both. The theory could be
used to guide development of federal legislation, new initiatives by the

144. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-09 (2012)); see
MARGRET A. WINZER, THE HISTORY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION: FROM ISOLATION TO INTEGRATION 381

(1993).
145. Charles Barone & Elizabeth DeBray, Education Policy in Congress: Perspectives from
Inside and Out, in CARROTS, STICKS, AND THE BULLY PULPIT: LESSONS FROM A HALF-CENTURY OF
FEDERAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 61, 63 (Frederick M. Hess & Andrew P. Kelly
eds., 2011) [hereinafter CARROTS, STICKS].

146. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
493-95 (1954); see also Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown:
Understanding and Remedying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated Schools, 88

N.C. L. REV. 787, 796-837 (2010) (analyzing how some of the Supreme Court's leading desegregation
decisions both prohibited and implicitly tolerated school segregation).
147. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.)
148. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 34, at 279-80.
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Department of Education, or-most likely-a combination of the two.
This theory is intentionally broad and does not propose a specific statute
or federal initiative because a wide variety of federal statutes and
initiatives could incorporate the elements identified here. Instead, this
theory provides research and ideas that could inform a variety of federal
reforms for many years to come. As Part III.B explains, I focus on future
action by Congress and the executive branch, rather than doctrinal reform
through the courts, because the legislative and executive branch enjoy
numerous policymaking strengths over courts.1 49
The following six policymaking areas identify how the federal
government's role in education should be expanded to ensure equal access
to an excellent education:
(1) Prioritizing a national goal of ensuring all children have equal
access to an excellent education and acknowledging that achieving
this goal will require disrupting education federalism; 5 o

'

(2) Incentivizing development of common opportunity-to-learn
standards that identify the education resources that states must
provide; '5
(3) Focusing rigorous research and technical assistance on the most
effective approaches to ensuring equal access to an excellent
education;1 52
(4) Distributing financial assistance with the goal of closing the
opportunity and achievement gaps;1

149. See infra Part IlI.B.
150. In arguing for a restructuring of education federalism, I join the call of other scholars who
have recommended expanding the federal role in education and redefining the federal-state
relationship to advance equal educational opportunity. See, e.g., REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at

69-76 (arguing that Congress should require that all states provide a "meaningful educational
opportunity" when it reauthorizes the Elementary and Secondary Education Act); Liu, supranote 3, at

2049-50 (arguing that Congress should ensure "educational adequacy for equal citizenship" that, inter
alia, reduces interstate inequalities in education).

151. Cf REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 157-58 (arguing that NCLB should be revised to
require that all children receive a "meaningful educational opportunity" and noting the "educational
essentials" that students should receive); Liu, supra note 3, at 2103 (arguing that Congress should

ensure "a common baseline of educational opportunity for equal citizenship").
152.

See COLLISION COURSE, supranote 56, at 160.

153. See James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of The No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 932, 989 (2004); Paul T. Hill, The Federal Role in Education, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EDUC.
POLICY, no. 3, 2000, at 11, 34; COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 160.
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(5) Demanding continuous improvement from states to ensure equal
access to an excellent education through federal oversight that
utilizes a collaborative enforcement model; 154 and
(6) Establishing the federal government as the final guarantor of
equal access to an excellent education' 55 by strengthening the
relationship between federal influence and responsibility.
As the analysis below will show, each of these elements either suggests
how to leverage existing strengths of federal policymaking more
effectively or fills in important gaps of federal policymaking and
enforcement. 5 6
Federal education law and policy that encompasses these elements
would greatly increase federal responsibility as part of a national effort to
ensure equal access to an excellent education while setting the foundation
for a shoulder-to-shoulder working relationship with the states to achieve
this goal. In contrast to existing federal education policy that too often
demands much from the states but gives them relatively little,' my
proposed theory would strengthen the relationship between increasing
federal demands for reform and greater federal responsibility for
accomplishing those reforms. If federal education law and policymaking
embraced each of these elements, collectively these reforms would place
primary responsibility on the federal government for establishing a
national framework for ensuring equal access to an excellent education.
A. Prioritizinga National Goal ofEnsuringEqualAccess to an Excellent
Education
The federal government must identify a national goal of ensuring that
all children are provided equal access to an excellent education. Some
national leaders already have noted the importance of this goal.'

154. See Robinson, supranote 37, at 1715-22.
155. Cf Liu, supra note 3, at 2049 ("Congress is duty-bound to secure equal national citizenship
by serving as the ultimate guarantor of educational opportunity.").

156. See, e.g., COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 159-61 (identifying several strengths of
federal policymaking in education).
157. NCLB has been criticized because, among other things, "through NCLB the federal
government can achieve its policy goals on the proverbial financial backs of states and local school
districts." Heise, supra note 52, at 141.
158. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Speech to the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce
(Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/ObamaHispanicChamber
Commerce.html ("The relative decline of American education is untenable for our economy, it's
unsustainable for our democracy, it's unacceptable for our children-and we can't afford to let it
continue.").
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However, some key points are missing from this rhetoric that must be
emphasized to support the type of comprehensive reforms envisioned in
this Article. For instance, the nation's top education leaders, including the
President, the Secretary of Education, and members of Congress, would
need to initiate a national conversation on why the United States should no
longer tolerate longstanding disparities in educational opportunity and
why federal action is needed to address them. 59
Federal and national education leaders also must make the case that the
entire nation would benefit from ending inequitable disparities in
education because research reveals that reforms to help those who are
disadvantaged typically do not succeed unless they benefit more privileged
Americans.1 6 0 Therefore, the federal government must convince the more
affluent segments of American society that a more equitable distribution
of educational opportunity would inure to their benefit. This could be
accomplished in part by publicizing existing research that quantifies the
myriad of high costs that the United States pays for offering many
schoolchildren a substandard education and that acknowledges that even
many advantaged children are not competing effectively with their
international peers.' 6 ' Initiating such a conversation also requires the
federal government to prioritize equal access to an excellent education
among its national policymaking agenda.
One way that federal leaders are beginning to identify concrete ways to
close the opportunity gap is through President Obama's call to Congress,
elected leaders, and business executives to make high-quality preschool
education available for all children.' 62 This call to close one element of the
opportunity gap builds upon robust research that reveals that investing in
preschool education yields substantial educational, societal, and financial

159.

See supra text accompanying notes 73-87, 125-42.

160. See COHEN & MOFFITT, supra note 35, at 9 ("Though this state of affairs rankles advocates,
government seems unable to devise programs to help the poor unless they also offer something to
more advantaged Americans. Absent a large and well-organized poor peoples' movement, coalitions
that spread benefits and unite sentiment behind programs for poor people are essential.") (footnote

omitted).
161. Cf supra text accompanying notes 81-87, 131-36 HANUSHEK, PETERSON & WOESSMANN,
supra note 134, at vii.

162. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-union-address,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/48AU-4QGE ("Research shows that one of the best investments we can make in a

child's life is high-quality early education. Last year, I asked this Congress to help states make highquality pre-K available to every four year-old. As a parent as well as a President, I repeat that request
tonight.").
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benefits for the United States.163 Although closing the prekindergarten gap
represents an important component of closing the opportunity gap, it
remains only one small element of this gap in the United States. A broad
call and initiative for closing the full spectrum of the opportunity gap from
early childhood education through high school is essential and overdue.
Establishing equal access to an excellent education as a national
priority would require federal leadership to explain that a reexamination of
the nation's approach to education federalism is warranted. Leaders would
explain how education federalism has served as a barrier to past reforms'6
and the reasons that restructuring education federalism must occur if the
United States is ever going to ensure equal access to an excellent
education. 65 This discussion should highlight federal willingness to
shoulder greater responsibility for leading the national effort to achieve
this goal while emphasizing that effective comprehensive reform must
involve a shoulder-to-shoulder partnership among the federal, state, and
local governments.
Fortunately, the federal government has proven its ability to herald the
importance of new educational goals and appropaches in the national
interest.1 6 6 Research and history confirm that agenda setting serves as one
of the strengths of the federal government in education policymaking. 6 1
For instance, President Johnson successfully convinced Congress to
advance equal educational opportunity for low-income schoolchildren
through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 168 which includes
Title I, and the Economic Opportunity Act,' 69 which includes programs
like Head Start and Upward Bound.1 70 President Bush championed NCLB
and its insistence on proficiency for all children in math and reading,

163.

See W.S. Barnett

& Leonard N.

Masse, Comparative Benefit-Cost Analysis of the

Abecedarian Programand Its Policy Implications, 26 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 113, 122 (2007); Timothy
J. Bartik et al., Earnings Benefits of Tulsa's Pre-K Programfor Different Income Groups, 31 ECON. OF

EDUC. REV. 1143, 1156 (2012).
164. See generally Robinson, supra note I1, at 287, 297-307, 309-14, 322-30.
165. See infra Part I.B.
166. See Paul T. Hill, Getting it Right the Eighth Time: Reinventing the Federal Role, in NEW
DIRECTIONS: FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 147, 163 (Marci
Kanstoroom & Chester E. Finn, Jr. eds., 1999); COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 159-60;
167. See Chester E. Finn, Jr., Agenda-Setters and Duds: A Bully Pulpit, Indeed, in CARROTS,
STICKS, supra note 145, at 217, 217; Michael Mintrom & Sandra Vergari, Education Reform and
Accountability Issues in an Intergovernmental Context, 27 PUBLIUS 143, 152 (1997); COLLISION
COURSE, supra note 56, at 159-60.

168. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).

169. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (repealed 1981).
170. Finn, Jr., supra note 167, at 226.
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public reporting of testing data disaggregated by subgroups, and a range of
accountability interventions for failing schools."' Therefore, a federal call
to implement a comprehensive plan to ensure equal access to an excellent
education should build upon the lessons learned from these and other
federal reforms.
B. Incentivizing Development of Common Opportunity-to-Learn
Standards
A federal effort to ensure equal access to an excellent education should
incentivize the states to develop common opportunity-to-learn standards.
Opportunity-to-learn (OTL) represent one of the critical missing elements
of the current education reform agenda. OTL standards would identify the
in-school and out-of-school resources that students should receive in order
to meet rigorous achievement standards. 7 2 The standards in most states
are the common core standards, which were developed by a group of
assessment specialists and academics in response to a request from the
Council of Chief State School Officers and the National Governors
Association.1 73 The standards are intended to provide a clear set of math
and English language and literacy standards for kindergarten through
twelfth grade that would prepare all public schoolchildren to complete
their high school education and to be ready to enroll in college or
participate in the workforce.1 74 OTL standards are essential for ensuring
equal access to an excellent education because, as leading education
scholar Linda Darling-Hammond has noted, two decades of high standards
and testing implementation has revealed that "there is plentiful evidence
that-although standards and assessments have been useful in clarifying
goals and focusing attention on achievement-tests alone have not
improved schools or created educational opportunities without investments
in curriculum, teaching, and school supports."' 7 5 I recommend the

171. See id. at 227.
172.

See REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 69-74.

173. Elaine McArdle, What Happenedto the Common Core?, HARVARD ED. MAG., Sept. 3, 2014,
at 23.
174. See Common Core State Standards Initiative, FrequentlyAsked Questions, http://www.core
standards.org/about-the-standards/frequently-asked-questions/, archived at http://perma.cc/Y5Y9DQUK (last visited Feb. 20, 2015); Standards in Your State, COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS
INITIATIVE, http://www.corestandards.org/standards-in-your-state/, archived at http://perma.cc/7G6A-

MFAQ?type=live (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) (identifying the forty-three states that have adopted and
are implementing the common core standards along with the District of Columbia and four territories)
[hereinafter Standardsin Your State].
175. DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 19, at 74.
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adoption of common OTL standards to provide a mechanism for ensuring
that educational opportunities are distributed fairly so that state adoption
of high academic standards can have the intended effect of improving
educational outcomes.
1. UnderstandingCommon OTL Standards
Common OTL standards would aim to guide state efforts to reduce
substantial and impactful disparities in educational opportunity and set a
floor for equal educational opportunity, while states would retain the
flexibility to ensure greater equality of opportunity than the OTL standards
demand. The states would serve as the primary architects of the standards
because this approach fosters greater cooperation in implementing the
standards and reduces criticism that the standards represent a federal
takeover of education. As the standards are being developed, the federal
government could publicize research regarding the essential resources that
states must provide for students to achieve the learning benchmarks
contained in the common core standards.
Common OTL standards would need to be broad enough to preserve
the ability of states to adopt a variety of educational governance, funding,
and policymaking structures. Federal support for common OTL standards
should encourage state-level innovation and experimentation regarding
how each state implements the standards, thus preserving the states as
laboratories for education reform.17 6 The standards should eschew any
suggestion that a one-size-fits-all approach should be adopted for
education. 7 Moreover, decisions about how and what to teach, such as
how best to teach English language learners and whether to teach
creationism within a science curriculum, should remain within the purview
of state and local control.
Others also have called for OTL standards and some of these proposals
provide recommendations for the content of such standards. For instance,
the Equity and Excellence Commission recently made a somewhat similar
proposal by calling for each state to identify and publicize "the teaching
staff, programs and services needed to provide a meaningful educational
opportunity to all students of every race and income level ..

. based on

176. See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE GROWTH OF
NATIONAL POWER 5 (2d ed. 2008); Heise, supra note 52, at 131; Pinder, supra note 33, at 2-3.
177. See Jonathan H. Adler, Cooperation, Commandeering, or Crowding Out?: Federal
Intervention and State Choices in Health Care Policy, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 199, 203-04 (2011).
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evidence of effective education practices." 7 8 Similarly, some scholars,
such as Michael Rebell and Jessica Wolff, have argued that the federal
government should adopt federal OTL standards when the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act is reauthorized.1 7 9 The Scott Foundation has
initiated a National Opportunity to Learn Campaign and has produced
reports that describe the potential content of OTL standards and
recommend the adoption of such standards. 8 0
I agree with the proposal of the National Opportunity to Learn
Campaign for common OTL standards that would support the provision of
equitable resources as states implement the common core standards.' 8
However, in contrast to that proposal for mandatory federal OTL
standards, I recommend that that the federal government provide
incentives for states to develop these common OTL standards. As a result,
these standards would neither be federally defined, as the National
Opportunity to Learn Campaign and Rebell and Wolff recommend, nor
designed individually by each state, as the Equity and Excellence
Commission advocates. Instead, the federal government could incentivize
creation of OTL standards by building upon its success in incentivizing the
development of the common core standards through RTTT.1 8 2
In addition, a federal effort to support adoption of national OTL
standards would move beyond the Commission's recommendation in two
important ways. First, if the states agree to identify the resources that are
needed to offer a meaningful educational opportunity, they run the risk of
being sued under state constitutions for failing to provide these
resources.1 83 Given this likelihood, federal support for development of
common OTL standards must act as a check against state incentives to set
a low floor for educational opportunity.184 Federal support for these
standards would emphasize the importance of excellence in education and

178.

EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supra note 1, at 18. The report also recommends that

states assess and publish the costs of these resources based upon "the efficient and cost-effective use of
resources." Id.
179. REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 157. For a thorough analysis of the potential content of
such standards, see id. at 157-64.
180. See generally LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW ET AL., FRAMEWORK
FOR PROVIDING ALL STUDENTS AN OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN THROUGH REAUTHORIZATION OF THE
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 3 (2010); NAT'L OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN
CAMPAIGN, FEDERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 8-10 (2009).
181. See LAWYER'S COMMITTEE, supra note 180, at 2.

182. See McGuinn, supra note 26, at 143-45.
183. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417, 429, 442-43 (N.J. 1997) (holding the
New Jersey funding formula unconstitutional because it failed to link school funding to what students
must receive to learn the content in state standards).
184. See COLLISION COURSE, supranote 56, at 160.
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the need to empower U.S. students to compete successfully with their
counterparts around the world. In contrast, states sometimes maintain a
statewide or regional aim for education and lose sight of the reality that
students now compete in an international job market. Second, my theory
would draw upon the insights of states in defining essential educational
resources, but would not make each state the sole judge of its own
standards, as the Commission report would permit. Instead, the states
would have to reach agreement on common standards, which inevitably
would involve a compromise on what should be included.
Common OTL standards would identify not only what educational
resources should be offered but also establish some standards for the
quality of the resources needed to effectively implement rigorous
standards. For instance, common OTL standards could identify the
essential elements of high-quality prekindergarten education, especially
given President Obama's recent focus on this issue.' 85 The meaning of the
phrase "high-quality" can differ greatly among the states and
prekindergarten providers; thus some common baseline for an
understanding of "high-quality" should be established in common OTL
standards.
Common OTL standards also might establish the necessary access to
effective teachers, educational materials, and support services. The
analysis by Michael Rebell and Jessica Wolff provides helpful examples
of some of the elements that the standards should include. For instance,
they recommend that students should receive "effective teachers,
principals, and other personnel," "adequate school facilities," and
"instrumentalities of learning, including, but not limited to, up-to-date
textbooks, libraries, laboratories, and computers" among other essential
resources.1 86 Given the wide range of resources that could be included in a
common OTL standard, a thorough discussion of their essential content is
beyond the scope of this Article.
Ultimately, federal incentives for states to develop common OTL
standards would build upon past federal successes in addressing denials of
equal educational opportunity.1 8 7 Once these standards are developed,
states must undertake efforts to ensure that students are delivered an

185. Press Release, Fact Sheet: White House Office of Press Sec'y, President Obama's Plan for
Early Education for All Americans (Feb. 13, 2013) (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/
02/13/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-plan-early-education-all-americans),

archived at http://perma.cc/

RH8D-V6YW (identifying how the White House defines a "high-quality" preschool program).
186.

REBELL & WOLFF, supranote 8, at 157.

187. See Barone & DeBray, supra note 145, at 63.
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education consistent with the standards. Certainly, the standards initially
will be aspirational. Yet, reaching this reality first requires identifying the
standards as clear goals and then developing a step-by-step plan to
implement them. Such a plan would include examining the gap between
existing resources and the standards, determining the cost of bridging the
gap, and raising funds for closing the gap. As discussed below in Part II.C,
federal research, technical expertise, and financial assistance should be
offered to expand the capacity of states to bridge the gap between existing
resources and the common national OTL standards.
2. Shepherding a Successful Effortfor Developing Common OTL
Standards
In its inception, the standards and accountability movement recognized
that the success of academic standards depended upon ensuring that
students receive an equal opportunity to acquire the knowledge within
high standards. 18 OTL standards were tested, but proved politically
unsustainable, in the mid-1990s.1 8 9 In 1994, Congress passed Goals 2000:
Educate America Act and this law provided for two options for the
creation of OTL standards that established the conditions and resources
needed throughout the education system to provide students the
opportunity to learn the content set forth in voluntary national or state
content standards.1 90 First, the National Education Standards and
Improvement Council was created to develop voluntary OTL standards.1 9 1
Second, states were permitted to develop their own OTL standards.1 92 The
Improving America's Schools Act of 1994 (IASA) also conditioned Title I
funds on state development of rigorous content and performance
standards.' 93 IASA included a requirement that state plans must describe
how states will help districts and schools "develop the capacity" to achieve
high standards and that this plan could include OTL standards.1 9 4

188. See id. at 73-74.
189.

See McGUINN, supra note 30, at 109.

190. Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, § 3(a)(7), 108 Stat. 125 (1994)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); see REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 5253.
191. Goals 2000: Educate America Act §§ 212, 213(c); REBELL& WOLFF, supra note 8, at 52-53.
192. Goals 2000: Educate America Act § 213(d); REBELL & WOLFF, supranote 8, at 52-53.
193. Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § Il ll(b)(8), 108 Stat.
3518, 3523 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); McGuNN, supra note 30, at 96
tbl. 5.1.
194. See id.
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These provisions were enacted because of the recognition that students
could not be expected to achieve high standards without an equal
opportunity to learn the content within the standards. 19 5 However, shortly
after the passage of these laws, a Republican-controlled Congress repealed
the federal power to establish OTL standards and the mandate that states
should establish such standards.1 96
In contrast to the past effort, my recommendation of common OTL
standards comes at a time in U.S. history that is ripe for federal support for
such standards. When OTL standards were first considered, vigorous
debates were ongoing about the content and implementation of academic
97
standards and the appropriate federal role regarding those standards.1
Today, although some opposition to the common core standards has arisen
regarding concerns such as the pace of implementation and federal
involvement in these standards,' 98 all states have adopted academic
standards and the states are far closer to adopting common academic
standards than ever before.1 99 These common academic standards will
provide a consistent aim for education across states. This process will lay a
foundation for the states to identify what they need to provide to students
to meet these standards. This common endeavor, along with growing
federal support and influence in education, should provide a more fertile
ground for federal incentives to create common OTL standards.
In addition, state leadership could draw upon the lessons from school
finance litigation that attempts to define the educational opportunities that
students must receive to meet state constitutional obligations for
education. 20 0 This rich source of research was not available when OTL
standards were first introduced through federal legislation. 20 1 Although
obtaining federal support for these standards will likely involve a tough
political battle, the battle today would begin with greater ammunition and
more favorable conditions.

195. See DARLING-HAMMOND,supra note 19, at 73-74.
196. MCGUINN, supra note 30, at 109; REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 68.
197. See McGUINN, supranote 30, at 86.
198. See Javier C. Hernzindez, Responding to Critics, New York State Plans to Scale Back
Standardized Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2013, at Al6; Valerie Strauss, Slow Down Reforms, Say
School Chiefs in Maryland, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2014, at BI; Emma Brown, Gov. Jindal Attacks
Common Core, WASH. POST, FEB. 6,2015, AT A3.
199. RYAN, supra note 3, at 244 (noting that all states have implemented standards and tests

linked to these standards); Standards in Your State, supra note 174 (identifying the forty-three states
that have adopted and are implementing the common core standards).

200. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989)
(identifying seven capacities that the state must provide each child to secure the child's fundamental

right to an adequate education).
201. See REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 68.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I do not recommend federally
defined standards, as Goals 2000 envisioned and as some scholars have
recommended.20 2 Instead, I recommend federal support for a state effort to
develop national common OTL standards. Through state leadership and
consensus building, my recommendations could avoid some of the
opposition encountered by the prior attempt at OTL standards.
C. Focusing Rigorous FederalResearch and TechnicalAssistance on the
Most Effective Approachesfor States to Provide EqualAccess to an
Excellent Education
For the federal government to lead a comprehensive national effort to
ensure equal access to an excellent education, the federal government must
provide generous support for the rigorous, objective research and effective
technical assistance state and local governments will need to reach this
goal. Substantial variations exist in the educational, economic, and
administrative capabilities of states.203 One of the principal hindrances to
NCLB's success was insufficient capacity at the state and local level to
implement the required changes.204 Comprehensive reforms to ensure
equal access to an excellent education will demand even more from states
than NCLB. Therefore, federally supported research and technical
assistance must help state and local governments develop the capacity to
implement effective reforms.205
Fortunately, Congress already has begun to recognize the need for
rigorous educational research through its passage of the Education
Sciences Reform Act (ESRA).2 06 Congress passed ESRA in 2002 to
provide research that would assist the states in complying with NCLB. 207
ESRA created the Institute of Education Sciences (IES) and authorized
IES to engage only in research based on science. 208 This congressional
requirement represents a substantial shift in how the federal government is

202. See id. at 157.
203. See COHEN & MOFFITT, supra note 35, at 14.
204. See David K. Cohen & Susan L. Moffitt, The influence of Practiceon Policy, in SHAPING
EDUCATION POLICY: POWER AND PROCESS 63, 77-78 (Douglas E. Mitchell et al. eds., 2011);
COLLISION COURSE, supranote 56, at 49-52.
205. NANCY KOBER ET AL., CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, BETTER FEDERAL POLICIES LEADING TO
BETTER SCHOOLS 8 (2010); Fuhrman, supranote 116, at 151.
206. Education Sciences Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-279, 116 Stat. 1940 (codified as

amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
207.

Benjamin Michael Superfine, New Directions in School Funding and Governance: Moving

from Politics to Evidence, 98 KY. L.J. 653, 686 (2009-10).
208. 20 U.S.C. § 9511(a) (2012); Superfine, supra note 207, at 686-87.
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conducting and funding education research. 2 09 This change has been noted
as a promising development in congressional support for education
research and some believe that IES has helped emphasize evidence-based
approaches for education research that could focus attention on reforms
that could be replicated. 210 The passage of ESRA indicates that Congress
recognizes the need for federal support for high-quality education research
to enable the United States to reach its essential educational goals.
Rigorous, objective research that supports a national effort to ensure
equal access to an excellent education should build on this success while
also establishing an agenda that identifies the critical research states need
as they enact reforms to achieve this goal. This research would examine
the most cost-effective and efficient state funding methods that ensure
equal access to an excellent education. 2 1 1 It also could propose and test
funding models that states have not yet adopted. In addition, federal
research could assess school governance and funding models from other
countries that provide a more equitable distribution of educational
resources.
Additionally, federally supported research could help identify and
disseminate research regarding the essential characteristics of high-quality
educational offerings. For example, scientifically based research on such
topics as the essential characteristics of a high-quality prekindergarten
program should serve as the foundation for identifying how to close
opportunity gaps in prekindergarten education.2 12 Harvard scholar
Hirokazu Yoshikawa has found that these characteristics include involving
children in planning activities and creating low student-teacher ratios. 2 13 In

209.
210.

Superfine, supranote 207, at 686.
See id. at 689. In addition, the U.S. Department of Education's newly developed What Works

Clearinghouse has disseminated some research on promising educational practices. See Paul Manna,
Strong Federal Policies Benefit Local Districts, 90 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 568, 570 (2009).

211.

Cf Adler, supra note 177, at 205 (discussing the benefits of federal health research and

commenting that "information about the cost-effectiveness of given types of health interventions or the

likely market effects of certain types of policies are likely to apply across jurisdictions").
212. See Fact Sheet, supra note 185; see also, e.g., Ellen C. Frede, The Role of Program Quality
in Producing Early Childhood Program Benefits, FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Winter 1995, at 115, 120
("The longitudinal research supports the view that small class sizes and low child-to-teacher ratios

contribute to positive, long-term benefits for children from low-income families."); Nat'l Inst. of Child
Health & Human Dev. Early Child Care Research Network & Greg J. Duncan, Modeling the Impacts
of Child Care Quality on Children s Preschool Cognitive Development, 74 CHILD DEV. 1454, 1456

(2003) ("Findings from the National Child Care Staffing Study, the Cost, Quality, and Outcomes
Study, . . . as well as the NICHD Study of Early Child Care show that children attending programs in
which caregivers had more education and training, and in which child-staff ratios were smaller,
performed better across a range of cognitive and social measures.") (citations omitted).
213. Hirokazu Yoshikawa, Long-Term Effects of Early Childhood Programson Social Outcomes
and Delinquency, FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Winter 1995, at 51, 68 (finding that effective early childhood
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addition, the federal government should ensure that existing rigorous
research on this topic is disseminated to states so that states can avoid
costly duplication of research as they develop new programs.
A federal research agenda also should identify the primary
impediments to ensuring equal access to an excellent education. For
instance, research indicates that challenging work environments in urban
schools discourage highly qualified teachers from teaching in such
schools.214 Once common impediments are identified, research should
examine the costs and benefits of potential reforms to address these
impediments. The federal government could assist states and localities as
they undertake and support research that responds to regional, state, and
local conditions that present unique challenges. 2 15
Establishing a federal research agenda to ensure equal access to an
excellent education would capitalize on the federal government's
substantial comparative advantage over states and localities in conducting
and supporting research.216 It would eliminate the inefficiencies caused by
each state conducting its own research. This research also would reduce
the cost of state efforts to achieve this goal by offering research that
supplies the possible reforms for achieving this goal.217 Once this research
is disseminated, it would provide state and local governments sufficient
models to consider as they develop state- and district-specific plans of
action.
In addition to research assistance, the federal government should offer
technical assistance that supports state efforts to ensure equal access to an
excellent education. This component would strengthen the existing
federal-state relationship because the federal government offers technical
assistance on a wide variety of issues, including assistance on how to
achieve the core goals of RTTT, 2 18 early childhood education, 219 and
programs "emphasized the initiation and planning of activities by the child rather than the teacher" and
"staff-child ratios in infant/toddler educational child care were in the range of one adult to three or four
children, and I to 6 in preschool programs").
214. See RYAN, supranote 3, at 173.
215. See McGovern, supra note 72, at 1521. The federal government also could encourage state

innovation in developing new funding mechanisms through a variety of efforts, including federal
research grants and evaluations, funding to outside experts, and intergovernmental partnerships. See
Hill, supra note 166, at 175; KOBER ET AL., supra note 205, at 7; Manna, supra note 210, at 570.
216. See DAVID T. CONLEY, WHO GOVERNS OUR SCHOOLS? CHANGING ROLES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 32 (2003); Marshall S. Smith, Rethinking ESEA: A Zero-Base Reauthorization, in
CARROTS, STICKS, supra 145, at 231, 233; Fuhrman, supra note 116, at 151; COLLISION COURSE,

supra note 56, at 160.
217. See Adler, supra note 177, at 216, 218.
218.

See U.S. Dep't. of Educ., Race to the Top Resources, http://www2.ed.gov/aboutlinits/ed/

implementation-support-unit/tech-assist/index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
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special education.220 To achieve this goal, the states may need federal
technical assistance on the most effective and efficient funding
mechanisms and other reforms and the common barriers to successful
reforms. In addition, state and local governments may need federal
technical assistance regarding how to develop data collection systems that
enable states and localities to document the scope of opportunity gaps and
the effectiveness of efforts to reduce those gaps. Although NCLB provided
a strong impetus for states to develop new data systems in order to comply
with the law's standards for teacher quality, this issue received less
attention from states once it became clear that those requirements would
not consistently be enforced. 22 1 Federal technical assistance should help
preclude any unnecessary diversion of resources and duplication of effort
that would occur if each state had to develop such technical expertise on
its own.222
Additional federal technical assistance is essential to supplement the
limited capacity of some state education agencies to implement
comprehensive reform.223 As education scholar Paul Manna insightfully
noted in his comprehensive analysis of NCLB implementation:
[D]espite being charged with implementing education policy in a
state, these agencies have tended to possess little expertise in
actually working on substantively important education initiatives,
such as the development of standards, curriculum, and tests. Instead,
their main purpose has been to distribute state and federal money to
local communities and then monitor to ensure that those dollars
224
have been spent appropriately.
Although the capacity and expertise of state education agencies has grown
as they have implemented NCLB, these agencies, along with state
legislatures, may still lack the capacity and expertise to implement a
comprehensive reform agenda to ensure equal access to an excellent
education. The federal government could address this capacity gap by
providing essential expertise on effective reforms as its understanding of
these issues deepens through the implementation of the research agenda.

219.

See U.S. Dep't of Edue., Federal Technical Assistance for Early Learning, http://www.ed.

gov/early-learning/federal-technical-assistance (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
220. See Special Education-National Activities-Technical Assistance and Dissemination, U.S.

DEP'T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/programs/oseptad/index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
221.

See COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 55-58.

222. See Adler, supra note 177, at 205-06.
223.

See COLLISION COURSE, supranote 56, at 49.

224. Id.
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D. DistributingFinancialAssistance Focusedon Closing Opportunity and
Achievement Gaps
The federal government will need to provide financial assistance to
states to support a national effort to ensure equal access to an excellent
education due to the substantial cost of closing opportunity and
achievement gaps. 2 25 This financial support for education would leverage
the federal government's superior ability to redistribute resources among
the states.226 This superior ability stems in part from the federal
government's capacity to spread the costs of redistribution across a wider
national constituency than state governments. In addition, business
interests and the wealthy possess a greater ability to thwart redistribution
at the state level than at the federal level because they can threaten to leave
a state. 227 Past experience reveals that federal resources can be an effective
means for influencing state and local education policy. 2 28
The federal financial contribution should include both incentives and
assistance to address opportunity and achievement gaps. Financial
incentives will draw attention to this critical issue and motivate states that
have resisted reform, just as incentives motivated reform through RTTT.229
Financial assistance also will expand the potential reform options beyond
what states could implement with their own state resources and will supply
political cover for politicians who support reform.2 30 The federal
investment in efforts to ensure equal access to an excellent education
could include funding mechanisms such as competitive grants and formula
grants.
Federal financial support for closing opportunity and achievement gaps
will be essential for expanding state capacity to achieve this goal. A recent

225.

See, e.g., Obama, supra note 162 (noting the need for federal aid to support state

development of high-quality prekindergarten education).
226. See Kevin G. Weiner & Jeannie Oakes, Mandates Still Matter: Examining a Key Policy Tool
for Promoting Successful Equity-Minded Reform, in BRINGING EQUITY BACK, supra note 17, at 77, 89;
Gittell, supra note 75, at 39; COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 160; Ryan, supra note 153, at 989.

227. See Kleven, supra note 14, at401.
228. See COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 160 (noting the importance of federal grants to
incentivize desegregation and to provide flexibility to state and local governments); KOBER ET AL.,

supra note 205, at 5 ("Over the past several decades, the federal government has made important,
positive contributions to education by setting broad goals, redistributing resources to redress
inequities, mobilizing state and local governments to address pressing needs, and calling attention to
urgent national priorities and promising practices.").

229. See Friedman & Solow, supra note 27, at 146; McGuinn, supra note 26, at 143-47.
230. See Paul Manna & Laura L. Ryan, Competitive Grants and Educational Federalism:
President Obama s Race to the Top Program in Theory and Practice, 41 PUBLIUS 522, 542 (2011);
COHEN & MOFFITrr, supra note 35, at 11l; COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 95.
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move in this direction can be found in President Obama's proposal to
invest $75 billion in federal funds over ten years to ensure that all fouryear-olds receive a high-quality prekindergarten education. 3 In addition,
President Obama previously created incentives for states to invest in early
childhood education through the RTTT Early Learning Challenge by
offering states the chance to compete for $500 million in discretionary
grants if they expanded early childhood education to young children of
low-income families.232 Such efforts represent an important first step
toward closing the substantial opportunity and achievement gaps.
However, a comprehensive effort to ensure equal access to an excellent
education would need to invest federal resources across the full spectrum
of opportunity and achievement gaps in elementary and secondary
education.
Federal support for a national effort to ensure equal access to an
excellent education would not require federal funding for all of the
necessary state and local reforms. Instead, the federal government should
generously increase its contribution to education costs while continuing to
share these costs with the state governments. The level of generosity of
federal funding should be based upon the disparate capacities of states to
close opportunity and achievement gaps. 2 33 Generous federal financial
assistance would fund a larger percentage of the costs of reforms than had
occurred with past education reforms.2 34 These past reforms typically
failed to deliver the substantial funds that were initially anticipated when
the laws were enacted.235 For example, one of many criticisms of NCLB
was that the federal government covered very little of the implementation
costs.236 Since increasing federal funding for ensuring equal access to an
excellent education would simultaneously increase federal responsibility
for achieving this goal, my theory would create a closer and more effective
marriage between federal demands and federal responsibility as discussed
below further in Part ILF.237

231. H. BUDGET COMM. DEMOCRATIC STAFF, H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE
PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET 10 (2013).
232. Applications for New Awards; Race to the Top-Early Learning Challenge, 78 Fed. Reg.

53,992, 53,992 (Aug. 30, 2013).
233. Liu, supra note 3, at 2114.
234. Given this Article's focus on identifying the essential elements for a national effort to ensure
equal access to an excellent opportunity rather than proposing a specific statute or program, it does not

offer a specific dollar amount for the appropriate federal financial investment.
235. See JACK JENNINGS, CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, REFLECTIONS ON A HALF-CENTURY OF SCHOOL
REFORM: WHY HAVE WE FALLEN SHORT AND WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? 3 (2012).
236. See COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 62; REBELL& WOLFF,supra note 8, at 100.
237. Although some, such as education scholar Michael Heise, have suggested that federal
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Additionally, a blend of federal and state funding will encourage
greater efficiency than full federal funding.238 Shared funding should
encourage both the federal and state governments to contain costs. If the
federal government paid the full bill for any necessary reforms, the states
might inflate the alleged costs of such reforms. Shared financial
responsibility helps avoid such perverse incentives.
E. Demanding ContinuousImprovementfrom States on EnsuringEqual
Access to an Excellent Education Through FederalOversight that
Utilizes a CollaborativeEnforcement Model
A federally-led effort to ensure equal access to an excellent education
should include federal monitoring of state progress. Such monitoring
would provide federal accountability for state progress, thus helping to
foster improvement.2 39 Oversight also would enable the federal

involvement in education should be limited to what it funds, this Article's proposed theory disagrees
with that contention for three reasons. See Heise, supra note 52, at 149-50, 153; see also South Dakota

v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 216 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the federal government
should pay for what it seeks to accomplish through the Spending Clause). First, this approach would
greatly curtail federal involvement in education because the federal government does not enjoy a
limitless financial capacity to fund education given its competing policymaking priorities. The
reduction of the federal government's involvement in education would be a tremendous loss to the
nation because its role in education has served as an essential impetus for the nation's efforts to ensure
equal educational opportunity. See GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY & ERICA FRANKENBERG, CIVIL
RIGHTS PROJECT, SOUTHERN SLIPPAGE: GROWING SCHOOL SEGREGATION IN THE MOST
DESEGREGATED REGION OF THE COUNTRY 7-8 (2012); JENNINGS, supra note 235, at 2. If the federal

government had been limited to what it could pay for when it passed Title IX or the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, this legislation probably would not have been adopted or would have been
greatly limited. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2012)); Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-09 (2012)).
Second, shared federal and state funding for education encourages greater investment in education
because the federal government can encourage additional state investment in education by raising the

federal funding matching rate. In addition, states can purchase services less expensively because the
federal government would cover a portion of the costs. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). David Super offers some criticisms of federal matching programs and offers some
suggestions for improvement. See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV.

2544, 2587-88, 2649-50 (2005). Finally, requiring that states contribute to the reforms that will be
required will encourage state commitment to the success of those reforms. For these reasons, although

this Article recommends that the federal government should bear primary responsibility for
establishing a theory that will guide a national effort to ensure equal access to an excellent education,
this Article supports shared federal and state financial responsibility for achieving this goal.
238. See Mun Tsang & Henry M. Levin, The Impact ofIntergovernmentalGrants on Educational

Expenditure, 53 REV. OF EDUC. RESEARCH 329, 334-35 (1983).
239. See, e.g., Eric A. Hanushek, Why the Federal Government Should Be Involved in School

Accountability, 24 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 167, 171 (2005) ("[W]hile accountability as written
into federal law with NCLB can be improved, the existing system offers considerable real
improvement over the stagnant schools of the past decades.").
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government to identify states' needs for research, technical and financial
assistance when the states fail to seek it. Effective federal monitoring and
oversight of a national effort to ensure equal access to an excellent
education is also one of the missing components of the current education
reform agenda.
This federal monitoring should focus on a collaborative enforcement
approach to resolve any disputes between the federal and state
governments regarding how states achieve this goal. In a 2007 article, I
proposed a collaborative enforcement model for a federal right to
24 0
education and I envision this Article's theory adopting a similar model.
Under this collaborative approach, the federal government would establish
a periodic, reporting obligation on state efforts to ensure equal access to an
excellent education. 24 1 State reporting would describe progress on
achieving this goal, identify any impediments to progress, and offer
potential plans for reform. Input also would be sought from education
reform organizations, civil rights groups, and citizens so that the federal
government would have a full picture of state efforts.242 A panel or
24 3
commission of experts would review this information.
Upon receiving this information, the panel or commission would assess
state reforms and provide feedback on how states could improve their
efforts. 2 4 The panel or commission would not have authority to insist
upon implementation of these recommendations and instead would
245
Federal
encourage states to develop their own approaches.
ideas
of
source
research-based
as
a
serve
merely
would
recommendations
in
states
for state reform. The federal government also would assist
identifying hindrances to effective reforms and provide research and
technical assistance based on successful reforms in other states.246 This
federal monitoring would draw upon the superior federal capability for
enforcement of equity requirements. 24 7

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Robinson, supra note 37, at 1715-22.
Id. at 1716-18.
Id. at 1717-18.
Id. at 1718.
Id. at 1717-18; see Fuhrman,supra note 116, at 151 ("Washington's ability to fund and draw

on research that crosses state boundaries, to invest additional support in capacity-building functions
such as professional development, and to hold up a mirror to state efforts through evaluation studies,
NAEP, and cross-national assessments can provide important support for state reforms.").

245. See Robinson, supra note 37, at 1718-19.
246. See Manna, supra note 210, at 571 ("Their distance from the ground level gives federal
leaders a fantastic bird's-eye view of the system, which can help them find important leverage points
to promote reforms.").

247. See Black, supra note 46, at 1350-51. But see Barone & DeBray, supranote 145, at 71 ("On
things that follow along clear, bright lines-like funding formulas, requirements to set goals and
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In addition, the collaborative enforcement approach would view
penalties as an undesirable last resort, particularly given the additional
leverage that National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
may provide states to challenge implementation of federal programs,
which is discussed below. 24 8 Instead, it would embrace flexibility in
negotiating compliance with federal funding conditions when warranted
by unique state and local conditions. 24 9 A collaborative enforcement model
also would require the U.S. Department of Education to develop systems
to ensure consistency in federal oversight so that the inconsistent
enforcement that undermined NCLB's implementation, and prior
authorizations of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, is not
repeated.2 50
F. Establishingthe Federal Government as the Final GuarantorofEqual
Access to an Excellent Education by Strengthening the Relationship
Between FederalInfluence and Responsibility
By enacting federal legislation and initiatives that embrace each of the
elements discussed above, the federal government would reestablish itself
as the final guarantor of equal access to an excellent education.251
Historically, equal educational opportunity served as one of the principle
rationales for federal involvement in education.2 52 The federal government
has played a critical role in assisting vulnerable groups when the states
have failed to act in the national interest. 25 3 Yet, an increasing focus on

disaggregate data by subgroups, or targeted investments in pilot programs-Congress is generally able
to achieve its aims, or at least monitor its success in doing so. But on more nuanced policies, or ones

that require fairly focused monitoring of actions by states and school districts, it falls far short again
and again.").
248. See Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, to Spend, to Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REv. 83, 114 (2012);
Bagenstos, supranote 22, at 865, 908.
249. See PAUL MANNA, SCHOOL'S IN: FEDERALISM AND THE NATIONAL EDUCATION AGENDA

11l (2006) [hereinafter SCHOOL'S IN] ("Due to its own weaknesses in license and capacity relative to
state policymakers, federal officials often reason that if they did sanction or punish states, it is unlikely
these actions would produce the ultimate results they desire. It might also prevent these federal policy
entrepreneurs from developing their education agendas in the future.").
250. See COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 66.

251. See CONLEY, supra note 216, at 32 ("The federal government remains the level of
governance most concerned with equity issues. This is appropriate historically and also provides the
strongest legitimacy for a broad federal role.").
252. See Erik W. Robelen, The Evolving Federal Role, in LESSONS OF A CENTURY: A NATION'S

SCHOOLS COME OF AGE 240, 240 (2000); Kaestle, supra note 41, at 27.
253. Frederick M. Hess & Andrew P. Kelly, Reflections on the Federal Role: A Half-Century of
Hard-Won Lessons, in CARROTS, STICKS, supra note 145, at 273, 273, 275-76; CTR. ON EDUC.
POLICY, supra note 44, at 4.
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standards and accountability shifted federal attention away from issues of
educational equity, while federal reforms unsuccessfully attempted to
ensure a quality education for all schoolchildren.254 Although the federal
government consistently should aim to maintain excellence, it also needs
to reassert itself as the final guarantor of equal educational opportunity
because the current failure of the federal government to fulfill this role is
one of the critical missing elements of the education reform agenda. In
making this recommendation, I join with other scholars, such as Michael
Rebell and now-California Supreme Court Justice Goodwin Liu, whose
proposals call upon the federal government to guarantee some form of
equal educational opportunity.2 55
History suggests that the federal government is likely to be the only
level of government to engage in the leadership and substantial
redistribution of resources that equal access to an excellent education will
21
Local politics oftentimes hinders substantial efforts to
require.256
redistribute resources.25 7 Thus, it is unsurprising that it took federal
legislation to initiate numerous past reform efforts that addressed
disparities in educational opportunity, such as those that assist
disadvantaged students,258 girls and women,259 and disabled children.260
The federal government possesses an unparalleled ability to mobilize
national, state, and local reform when the United States confronts an
educational crisis. 2 6 1 Therefore, my call for a stronger federal role in
education would build upon the historical federal role in advancing
educational equity and the superior ability of the federal government to
accomplish a redistribution of educational opportunity.
By focusing its attention on the policymaking areas identified in Parts
II.A through E above, the federal government would shoulder the primary

254. Petrovich, supranote 17, at 3-4.
255. See, e.g., REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 9, 69-74 (arguing that all children should be
provided a meaningful educational opportunity and identifying its components); Liu, supra note 3, at
2049 (arguing that Congress should ensure "educational adequacy for equal citizenship") (italics
omitted).
256. Gittell, supranote 75, at 39.
257. See Kirst, supra note 44, at 15-16. Kirst argues that both federal and state governments

operate more effectively in school finance and civil rights arenas due to the roadblocks to
redistribution at the local level. Id. at 16.
258. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).

259. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2012)).
260. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-09 (2012)).
261. See Robinson, supranote 75, at 457.
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burden for a national effort to ensure equal access to an excellent
education. This primary federal burden would be carried through a
multifaceted approach in which each policymaking area would support
and reinforce the others and draw upon federal strengths in education
policymaking. At the same time, federal leadership would incentivize the
states to engage in a collaborative partnership with the federal government
to achieve this goal. States would retain substantial control over education
as they choose among a wide array of reforms while facing compelling
incentives to join in this national effort.
Some may argue that the states should bear the primary burden for
ensuring equal access to an excellent education because education remains
primarily a state function. I reject this dualist understanding of
education2 62 while highlighting our longstanding history that reveals that
the states will not rectify opportunity and achievement gaps on their own.
The federal role in education has grown significantly in recent decades and
has become increasingly influential.26 3 My proposed theory builds upon
the growing consensus reflected in NCLB and other federal education
legislation that the federal government should exercise a substantial role in
education law and policy.264
Others may contend that the United States should rein in the growing
federal role in education. In some ways, this criticism points to the failures
of past federal initiatives as evidence that the federal government's role in
education should be curtailed. Most recently, some scholars condemn the
shortcomings and implementation of NCLB and RTTT.2 65 Undeniably, the
federal government has undertaken a variety of unsuccessful education
reforms. 2 66 Yet, an established track record in education over the last fifty
years has given us ample evidence to identify the strengths and
weaknesses of federal education policymaking. My theory intentionally
builds upon identified federal strengths in innovative and progressive
ways. In particular, the theory builds on the foundational premise that in
the face of inconsistent and overwhelmingly ineffective state reform, the

262. See Joseph F. Zimmerman,

National-State Relations: Cooperative Federalism in the

Twentieth Century, 31 PUBLIUS 15, 15, 19 (2001).
263.

MCGuiNN, supranote 30, at 1.

264. Id
265. See, e.g., Maurice R. Dyson, Are We Really Racing to the Top or Leaving Behind the
Bottom? Challenging Conventional Wisdom and Dismantling Institutional Repression, 40 WASH. U.

J.L. & POL'Y 181, 238-43 (2012); Monica Teixeira de Sousa, A Race to the Bottom? President
Obama'sIncomplete and Conservative Strategyfor Reforming Education in Struggling Schools or the

Perils of Ignoring Poverty, 39 STETSON L. REv. 629, 630-31 (2010); McGUINN, supra note 30, at
183-87; RYAN, supra note 3, at 244-45.

266. See Finn, Jr., supranote 167, at 219-26.
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federal government enjoys a superior and more consistent reform record
on issues of educational equity. 2 67 Education scholars Charles Barone and
Elizabeth DeBray confirmed this superior track record in stating that:
Over the past half century, Congress has most frequently sought,
and in most cases successfully enacted, sweeping changes to federal
law when (1) a segment of U.S. Society was judged as having been
denied equal educational opportunity and (2) states and
municipalities were unable or unwilling to remedy those inequities.
In education, as in other areas, like voting rights or retirement
security for seniors, this has unquestionably been its most important
and powerful role.26 8
My theory builds upon this superior record in proposing a theory for
disrupting education federalism that can guide the United States toward
equal access to an excellent education.
In making the federal government the final guarantor of equal access to
an excellent education, my proposed theory would strengthen the
relationship between growing federal influence in education and greater
federal responsibility for accomplishing national objectives. This
transformation would greatly improve upon the nation's current
cooperative federalism framework for education. 269 Today, although the
federal government invests in education, this investment is quite limited
relative to state and local investments. 2 70 By increasing its demands while
limiting its contributions, the federal government has been able to avoid
shouldering a substantial portion of the costs and burdens associated with
accomplishing the nation's education goals while still enjoying the ability
to set the nation's education agenda and demand results.271 In contrast, my
proposal would establish a much closer and more effective marriage
between federal influence and responsibility.

267.

See Hess & Kelly, supra note 253, at 275-76; JENNINGS, supra note 235, at 2-3.

268.

Barone & DeBray, supranote 145, at 63.

269.

See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98

COLUM. L. REV. 267, 434 (1998).
270.

See SCHOOL'S IN, supra note 249, at 111-12; NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note

47, at 2, 4 tbl.l.
271. See Heise, supra note 52, at 141; Robinson, supra note 75, at 462-64 (reviewing RYAN,
supranote 3).
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III. THE BALANCE SHEET FOR DISRUPTING EDUCATION FEDERALISM

In response to my theory for strengthening the federal role in education
to establish the foundation for a national effort to ensure equal access to an
excellent education, critics may raise a variety of objections. Some may
contend that Congress could not pass legislation that builds on my theory
because it could violate the Spending Clause requirements that were
strengthened in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
(NFIB),272 the Supreme Court's first opinion striking down a federal law
under the Spending Clause. Others may argue that the courts represent the
most fruitful avenue for systemic education reform rather than the
legislative or executive branch. In addition, some may contend that my
proposed theory would reduce some of the benefits of education
federalism, such as state and local control over education and
accountability. Another likely objection is that the United States lacks the
political will to implement this theory. This Part responds to these
objections and highlights numerous strengths of my proposed theory.
A. UnderstandingWhy National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius Leaves Ample ConstitutionalRoom for Expanding the Federal
Role in Education
Although the Supreme Court in NFIB upheld the mandate requiring
individuals to acquire health insurance as a valid exercise of the
congressional authority to tax,273 it also held that the Affordable Care
Act's penalty on states that chose not to participate in the expansion of the
Medicaid program was unconstitutionally coercive in violation of the
Spending Clause. 274 Until the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, the
Court had placed very few limits on Spending Clause authority. 2 75 Given
the shift in the Court's understanding of the scope of authority under the
Spending Clause and my reliance on congressional action as one avenue
for disrupting education federalism, it is important to understand what
impact this decision could have on my theory.

272. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
273. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (plurality opinion).
274. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606-07 (2012) (plurality opinion); id at 2666-67 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas & Alito, J.J., dissenting).
275. For a full and thoughtful analysis of the impact of NFIB on federal education law, please see
Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 584-91.
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Although the Court established five conditions for Spending Clause
legislation in South Dakota v. Dole,276 with the exception of the
requirement that conditions must be unambiguous, the Court since Dole
and prior to NFIB had not applied these conditions to establish meaningful
substantive limits for Spending Clause legislation.2 77 Prior to NFIB, the
Court's minimal enforcement of the requirement that statutory conditions
may not be so coercive that they become compulsory was generally
understood to be "[t]he virtual judicial abandonment of coercion
analysis." 2 78 With little fear of judicial interference, Congress was able to
employ its expansive authority under the Spending Clause to enact
legislation covering a broad variety of areas that it does not possess direct
authority to regulate, including education, the environment, and social
welfareIf -issues.279
The Court in NFIB found for the first time that a Spending Clause
statute had crossed the line from coercion to compulsion. 2 80 The plurality
opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan,
determined that the Medicaid expansion that required the states to insure
anyone under age sixty-five with an income of less than 133% of the
federal poverty line was unconstitutionally coercive.2 8 1 The plurality's
analysis focused on several factors to find a constitutional violation, and I
agree with scholars Eloise Pasachoff and Samuel Bagenstos that the best
reading of the opinion is that each of these factors must exist for the
plurality to find a statute unconstitutional.2 82 The plurality first noted that,
rather than establish new conditions for new funds, Congress threatened to
276. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). The Court required that the conditions for federal spending must:
(1) benefit the general welfare, (2) be unambiguous, (3) be related to the federal interest in the statute,
(4) cannot induce the states to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional and
(5) cannot be so coercive as to pass the point at which "pressure turns into compulsion." Id. at 207,

208, 210-11 (internal quotations omitted).
277. Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 588-89. On the unambiguous requirement, the Court has insisted
that states have "clear notice" regarding the conditions for accepting federal funds. See Arlington Cent.

Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 300 (2006); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause
Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 393-409 (2008); Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 58889. Even this limitation did not stop Congress from enacting Spending Clause legislation, as it merely
established an interpretive rule that requires Spending Clause legislation to be enacted with great

clarity such that the states fully understand the conditions for receiving federal funds. Pasachoff, supra
note 22, at 589.
278. Heise, supra note 52, at 137.
279. Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 589-90.
280. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (plurality
opinion); id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and

dissenting in part).
281. Id. at 2606-07 (plurality opinion).
282. See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 864-65; Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 594.
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withhold both new and existing Medicaid funds if a state did not agree to
the expansion. 2 83 The plurality found that this threat effectively forced
states to acquiesce to the Medicaid expansion because when the
"conditions take the form of threats to terminate other significant
independent grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of
pressuring the states to accept policy changes." 2 84 This threat triggered an
analysis by the plurality of whether the threat had crossed the line from
coercion to compulsion.285

The plurality then determined that the terms were unconstitutionally
coercive because it considered the threatened loss of all Medicaid funding,
which accounts for more than ten percent of a State's total budget, to be
"economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to
acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion" 286 and essentially "a gun to the
head" of the states.287 Finally, the plurality concluded by noting that
although the states agreed that Congress could amend or alter Medicaid
when they accepted Medicaid funds, the requirement that Congress must
attach unambiguous conditions to federal grants means that Congress
cannot create "a new health care program" under the guise of merely
amending the original program.288 Given that the Medicaid expansion
transformed the program from one that serves some of the neediest
individuals in society to one that provides healthcare for anyone with an
income below 133% of the poverty line, the states did not agree to this
dramatic expansion when they agreed that Congress could amend
Medicaid.2 89
In contrast to the plurality opinion, the joint dissent, which was one
vote shy of a majority, focused on one factor-"economic dragooning." 2 90
The joint dissent agreed that the statute was unconstitutionally coercive
because of both the percentage of the total state budgets that would be
affected as well as the amounts that would be withheld from the states. 291
The joint dissent noted that the program at stake in Dole would have
involved "[w]ithholding $614.7 million, equaling only 0.19% of all state

283. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603-04 (plurality opinion).
284. Id. at 2604.
285. Pasachoff, supranote 22, at 598.
286. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (plurality opinion).
287. Id. at 2604.
288. Id. at 2606.
289. Id.
290. Pasachoff, supranote 22, at 605-12.
291. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2661-62, 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, J.J., dissenting); see
Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 605-08 (noting both factors as relevant to the joint dissent's analysis).
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expenditures combined" and that this amount is appropriately described as
a "relatively mild encouragement." 2 92 In contrast, the Affordable Care
Act's Medicaid expansion would "threaten[] to withhold $233 billion,
equaling 21.86% of all state expenditures combined" and thus is
unambiguously coercive.293 The emphasis on the percentage of the state
budget common to both the plurality and joint dissent suggests that this
analysis may be the more critical one for future opinions.
Scholars offer some tentative possibilities about the decision's potential
impact on future Spending Clause legislation and how such legislation will
be administered by federal agencies.294 Several scholars contend that the
decision could potentially invite challenges to an assortment of Spending
Clause legislation that will seek to establish how much the Court is willing
to limit this previously broad congressional authority. 295 Scholars express
mixed views about the potential success of such challenges 296 and note the
In
decision's lack of clarity regarding the definition of coercion.
addition, several scholars posit that the decision will grant states additional

292.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2664 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, J.J., dissenting) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

293.

Id.

294.

See, e.g., Emest A. Young, A Research Agenda for Uncooperative Federalists, 48 TULSA L.

REV. 427, 442 (2013) ("If the first of these variables-the sheer amount of money involved-tums out
to be critical, then NFIB's Spending Clause holding may turn out to be a ticket for this day and train
only. But if the old money/new money distinction has legs, then this may allow the states to effect
partial opt-outs from federal spending programs."); Metzger, supra note 248, at 111-12 ("If these

limits on Congress's tax and spending powers turn out to have legs, they could undermine the viability
of the indirect regulatory options that Chief Justice Roberts defends. Placing significant restrictions on
funding conditions, or on what can count as a tax, risks rendering these financial inducements
ineffectual as mechanisms for achieving regulatory aims.... But if these new tax and spending limits

prove largely nominal, Congress will be able to regulate as it wants through money."). Scholars also
note the potential impact on the judiciary, including the difficulty of identifying unconstitutional
coercion after the decision. See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties:

Medicaidand Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1,
6 (2013) (noting how little guidance NFIB provides lower courts for Spending Clause challenges).
295. See, e.g., James F. Freeley Ill, Essay, National Federation of Independent Business v.
&

Sebelius: The Constitutionality of Health Care Reform and the Spending Clause, 45 CONN. L. REV.
CONNTEMPLATIONS 19, 27 n.59 (2013); Mark A. Hall, A Healthcare Case for the Ages, 6 J. HEALTH

LIFE Sci. L. 1, 11 (2012); Huberfeld et al., supranote 294, at 6.
296. Compare Huberfeld et al., supra note 294, at 50 ("Proponents of broad federal power will no
doubt claim that the decision is sui generis and limited to its particular facts. But both the result and
the rhetoric in NFIB suggest that it is a launch, not a landing."), with Metzger, supra note 248, at 114

("State claims of coercion seem likely to surface, whether or not they succeed. At a minimum, NFIB
appears to give states greater leverage in resisting the imposition of new conditions attached to extant
federal funds. States' ability to exercise this leverage in court, however, is likely to remain
constrained.").
297. See Michelle Biddulph & Dwight G. Newman, Comparativist-StructuralApproaches to
Interpretation of the Post-ObamacareSpending Power, 21 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 14-15

(2012); Huberfeld et al., supra note 294, at 70, 88.
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leverage to negotiate with federal agencies regarding how Spending
Clause programs are administered and may lead to additional waivers
from federal agencies that fear a successful judicial challenge to their
program under NFIB.298
In considering what NFIB will mean for education federalism, I agree
with those who contend that education programs within NCLB, as well as
other major education laws, are likely to be upheld even after NFIB.2 99 As
states are permitted to select which NCLB programs they want to
participate in, it is important to analyze the constitutionality of NCLB
based upon the separate programs that are packaged within the law. 300
Title I represents the largest program under NCLB and cost approximately
$17.114 billion for fiscal year 2011.301 For fiscal year 2011, states spent a
total of $1.672 trillion and thus Title I represents 1.02% of states'
budgets. 3 02 As education law scholar Eloise Pasachoff previously noted
when she conducted this analysis, this potential loss is far closer to the
potential loss to South Dakota that the Court upheld as constitutional in
Dole than to the threatened loss in NFIB.303 In addition, NCLB also avoids
the NFIB concerns by eliminating the pre-NCLB Elementary and
Secondary Education Act; thus, new funds are not conditioned on an old
program. 304 Given that NCLB represents the most intrusive and extensive
federal education law in U.S. history, the strong likelihood that the largest
program within this law is constitutional under NFIB suggests that
Congress is likely to retain extensive authority to pass additional education
legislation under the Spending Clause.305
Even after NFIB, Congress enjoys ample constitutional room to
leverage federal funds to institute this Article's theory for ensuring equal
access to an excellent education for several reasons. It is important to note
that the plurality found the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid expansion to

298. See Bagenstos, supranote 22, at 907-08; Metzger, supra note 248, at 114-15; Young, supra
note 294, at 442-43.
299. See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 892; Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 582.
300. Cf Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 614.

301. STEPHEN Q. CORNMAN ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, REVENUES AND
EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS: SCHOOL YEAR 201011, at 18 tbl.8 (2013).
302. See NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT: EXAMINING
FISCAL 2011-13 STATE SPENDING 7 tbl.1 (2013); see also Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 629
(conducting the same analysis for 2008-09 using the same data sources).
303. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604-05 (2012) (plurality
opinion); Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 622.
304. See Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 619.
305. For a thoughtful analysis of why the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act would
remain constitutional under NFIB, please see id. at 633-42.
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be coercive because of the combined effect of several factors rather than
any single factor.306 Thus, a fair reading of the plurality opinion suggests
that to run afoul of NFIB, a federal education program would have to take
a pre-existing, large, well-entrenched program, add new and unforeseen
conditions that are so substantial as to constitute an independent program,
and present the possibility of losing all funds for both the old and new as
conditions for any state not wanting to follow the new conditions. 3 07 The
need to run afoul of multiple concerns simultaneously will leave Congress
with ample room to enact far-reaching education legislation.
In addition, both the plurality and the joint dissent reaffirmed the
ability to attach conditions to the grant of new funds.30 8 Together these
opinions make clear that a new federal education program that offered new
funding in exchange for state compliance with conditions for spending
those funds should easily pass constitutional muster under NFIB.
Furthermore, such a law would remain constitutional even if the new
funds and conditions build upon a preexisting federal conditional spending
program. This is permissible because the plurality and joint dissent both
indicated approval for attaching new conditions that built upon the prior
Medicaid program as long as those conditions did not jeopardize the
previously authorized and accepted Medicaid funds. 3 0 9
Finally, broad constitutional authority still exists for Congress to ensure
equal access to an excellent education under the Spending Clause because,
as the joint dissent noted, even though education spending is the second
largest federally funded item, the total amount of all federal education
programs currently represents a relatively small percentage of all state
expenditures-"only 6.6% of all state expenditures combined." 3'0 This
total amount includes a wide variety of federal education programs,
including Title I and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. This
percentage pales in comparison to the approximately 22% of total state
budgets that were allocated to pre-expansion Medicaid. 3 11 Even if the
federal government adopted a generous and robust plan to ensure that all

306. See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 864-65; Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 594.
307. See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 864-65; Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 593-94. The joint
dissent focused on both the size of the federal grant and the impact on the states' budgets. NFIB, 132
S. Ct. at 2661-62, 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, J.J., dissenting).
308. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (plurality opinion); id. at 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito,
JJ., dissenting).

309.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (plurality opinion); id. at 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito,

JJ., dissenting); see Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 657-58.

310. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
311. Id.
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children receive equal access to an excellent education, it seems very
unlikely that its funding of one education program would surpass the total
amount that it spent on a wide variety of elementary and secondary
education programs.3 12 Therefore, NFIB leaves Congress ample
constitutional authority to ensure equal access to an excellent education.
B. Legislative and Executive Authority Provides a More FruitfulAvenue
for Reform than JudicialAuthority
My theory proposes a framework for how the federal legislative and
executive branches could lead the United States in a comprehensive effort
to ensure equal access to an excellent education. I do not recommend that
the courts should serve as the primary focus for reform for numerous
reasons. As previously noted, federal courts frequently have relied on
federalism and the interest in local control of education as a reason for
curtailing efforts that sought to advance equal educational opportunity. 3 13
Also, as I analyzed in detail in prior scholarship, courts provide an inferior
forum for education policy reform.3 14 Courts have found a limited ability
to institute effective school finance reform when their decisions did not
garner significant political support. 3 15 Litigation is oftentimes slow and
piecemeal and relies on a court order before a state will initiate reform.
Yet, even in the face of such an order, legislatures can remain resistant to
change. 3 16 Once reform is initiated, court-driven reform also can be
difficult and laborious if all or even most revisions to the initial plans
require court approval. 1 Federal judges often lack substantive knowledge
of the complex and nuanced education issues. 318 Furthermore, litigation
solutions are typically driven by the evidence before the court and thus fail
to recognize the competing interests of absent affected constituencies.

312.

For instance, Goodwin Liu estimated that a federal education program that, among other

things, would reduce interstate inequality in education spending would cost $30 billion annually in
additional education spending. See Liu, supra note 3, at 2119-24. Even such a comprehensive and
substantial federal effort aimed at addressing inequality in education through one program would still
represent a relatively small percentage of states' overall budget when compared to the substantial

percentage that states could have lost in NFIB. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas
& Alito, JJ., dissenting).
313. See supratext accompanying notes 101-09.

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

See Robinson, supra note 37, at 1715, 1728-35.
See id. at 1728.
See id. at 1734.
See id. at 1730.
See id. at 1731.
See id. at 1734.
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In contrast, federal support, research, and funding for reform can
provide a counterbalance to state and local insistence on maintaining the
status quo. 32 0 A federal legislative and executive approach can offer
comprehensive solutions that incentivize actions by all of the states, a feat
that a litigation effort is unlikely to accomplish.32 ' In contrast to litigation
that regularly requires court approval for any changes to a remedial order,
legislative or executive action can offer much-needed flexibility to revisit
and refine the legislation, regulations, or initiatives that are
implemented.32 2 Legislative and executive action also would benefit from
the expertise of federal policymakers who have knowledge of and
experience in education and its many complexities. Federal policymakers
can seek input from states, scholars, and policymakcrs when additional
expertise and research is needed.323 Additionally, the legislative and
executive process can provide a more comprehensive assessment of the
problem, the affected constituencies, and possible avenues for reform. 324
Perhaps most importantly, a court-centered reform effort would
undermine the collaborative enforcement approach that is critical for
sustained and continuous improvement by the states. Litigation would
introduce an adversarial nature to reform and pit the federal government
against states and localities.325 In contrast, I propose a collaborative
approach in which the federal, state, and local governments enter a
shoulder-to-shoulder partnership to ensure consistent improvement
through federal assistance for state and local reforms.326 For these and
other reasons, 3 27 my theory relies upon the legislative and executive
branches as the avenues for reform. Nevertheless, my theory also could
inform judicial understanding of the need to reform education federalism
so that education federalism does not continue to serve as one of the
obstacles to effective reform.

320. See id at 1729.
321. See id. at 1734.
322. See id at 1730.
323. See id. at 1732.
324. See id. at 1734.
325. See id. at 1733-34.
326. See id.
327. For the full discussion of why a court-centered reform agenda should not be the focus of
federal reforms that seek equal educational opportunity, see id at 1728-34.
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C. How DisruptingEducation Federalism Would Empower New Aspects
ofState and Local Controlof andAccountabilityfor Education and
EncourageInnovation
Some may critique my proposed theory for reducing state and local
control of and accountability for education. As analyzed in Part I.B. 1, it is
important to remember that state and local control of education has greatly
diminished over the last few decades and that scholars have noted that
local control has not characterized the nation's schools for quite some
time.328 In addition, local control is not typically considered an end in
itself. As political scientist Douglas Reed insightfully noted, "Local
control is a good thing to the extent that it improves educational
performance and builds strong communities; to the extent that it isolates,
excludes, and homogenizes our schools, rendering them grossly unequal,
localism is a problem." 329 Therefore, my theory seeks to reduce harmful
aspects of state and local control of education while simultaneously
empowering beneficial and collaborative aspects.
Under my proposed theory, states admittedly would lose some control
over education because they would be accountable to the federal
government for ending longstanding disparities in educational opportunity.
A hallmark of the American education system has been the freedom that
mostly affluent parents enjoy: to provide their children a better education
than the one given to less privileged children.330 In addition, some states
and localities also may contend that they should retain the ability to focus
their resources on some children rather than spreading them more
equitably to all children.3 31 I contend that the loss of this type of state and
local control would benefit the nation's education system.
At the same time, other aspects of state and local control of education
would remain if my theory was adopted. Under this theory, states would

328.

See supra text accompanying notes 88-92; see also Ryan, supra note 52, at 60 ("There is a

popular belief that public schools are locally controlled. As a legal matter, this has always been
something of a myth."); Heise, supra note 52, at 131 ("However alluring, such notions of local control
over America's school policy have not accurately described the reality of American education policy
for decades.").
329. DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY 179-80 (2001).
330. See JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCOVRONICK, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 138-39 (2003).
331. For instance, the state of Texas suggested such an argument when it argued that it should not
be required to provide an education to children of undocumented immigrants because these students

are not "persons" protected by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States
Constitution. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210-14 (1982).
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retain authority to control education policymaking through education
governance, the nature and content of a school finance system, state
assessments and graduation standards, and a wide variety of teaching and
curricular decisions. 332 Localities would continue to administer education,
manage the daily operation of schools, hire teachers and staff, build and
maintain schools, and transport students.333 Issues such as class size and
governance would remain within the purview of state and local
government. Furthermore, maintaining these functions under state and
local authority fosters continuance of most of the existing levels of state
and local accountability for education.
Most importantly, my proposed theory would foster new types of state
and local control over education. Currently, substantial disparities exist in
each state's capacity to offer high-quality educational opportunities. 3 34 The
absence of federal intervention to address these disparate capacities leaves
many states without the ability to offer their citizens an excellent
education. Placing primary responsibility on the federal government for
leading a national effort to close opportunity and achievement gaps will
expand state and local control of education because it will provide state
and local governments both a greater and more equal capacity to offer all
children an excellent education.33 5 This enhanced capacity will empower
states and localities to engage in innovative reforms that were previously
hindered by capacity limitations. In this way, greater equity in the
distribution of state and local control and equal access to an excellent
education can co-exist as complementary rather than competing goals.
Once each state has a more uniform ability to offer equal access to an
excellent education, the states will decide how they want to achieve this
goal. By leaving the methods for achieving this goal to the states, my
theory will preserve the states and localities as laboratories of reform.
Moreover, these laboratories would have new federal research, technical
expertise, and financial assistance to support the identification and
implementation of effective reforms. Therefore, those who believe that
excellence is best fostered through state and local control may find
comfort in the fact that under my proposed theory, the states ultimately
would decide how to ensure equal access to an excellent education.

332. See Ryan, supranote 52, at 57-59.
333. See Hill, supra note 46, at 78; Ryan, supranote 52, at 57.
334. See COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 49-52; Liu, supranote 3, at 2047.

335. See David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 389
(2001) (noting that for a central intervention to support the values of local control it must "promote the
capacity of the local government to adopt policies that current central law frustrates").

1016

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 92:959

Federal reform consistent with my theory for disrupting education
federalism might diminish some state and local accountability for
education. Once the federal government takes responsibility as the final
guarantor of equal access to an excellent education and thereafter monitors
state progress toward achieving this goal, the public will begin to hold the
federal government accountable for educational disparities. This
accountability is more diffuse and less effective than state and local
accountability because federal officials are more removed from state and
local electorates and are held accountable for a wider range of decisions. 3 36
However, it is important to note two responses to this concern. First,
the public has not effectively held state and local officials accountable for
closing opportunity gaps. For that reason, adding an additional layer of
accountability-even a diffuse layer-could facilitate achievement of this
objective. Second, as noted above, this proposed theory would not remove
state and local accountability for ensuring equal access to an excellent
education. Instead, state and local officials would be charged with
designing and implementing plans to achieve this goal and thus critical
aspects of state and local accountability would be preserved.33 7 Federal
officials would be responsible for offering some of the incentives,
research, expertise, and financial support that is needed to accomplish this
objective. In these ways, my proposed theory ultimately would increase
total government accountability for achieving this goal. For these reasons,
it would more effectively reap some of the benefits that education
federalism is designed to achieve.
D. Building the PoliticalWillfor EducationReform that Ensures Equal
Access to an Excellent Education
Additional objections to my theory may focus on the lack of political
will to adopt it. Some may argue that the nation is not ready to do what it
takes to complete a comprehensive assault on opportunity and
achievement gaps. My proposed theory is intentionally unapologetic in its
comprehensive and aspirational scope. Its comprehensive nature seeks to
address the fact that past education reforms have not attempted to address
the magnitude of the problem confronting the nation. 338 It leverages the
expanding federal role in education as the opportune time to restructure

336. See Ryan, supranote 100, at 607.
337. See Adler, supra note 177, at 204.
338. See Michael A. Rebell, The Needfor Comprehensive Educational Equality, in THE PRICE WE
PAY, supra note 10, at 255, 257; EQUITY &EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supra note 1, at 14.
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education federalism in ways that support the nation's education goals. As
leading education historian Carl Kaestle has noted, "Presidents and
Congress will continue to reinvent the federal role, because education has
become a top-tier domestic agenda item and because federalist traditions
do not make clear what the federal role in education is, nor how reformers
should proceed to improve education on a national scale." 339 As the federal
role in education continues to expand, this Article seeks to supply some of
the critical answers that debates on education reform lack regarding how
education federalism should be restructured to support effective,
comprehensive reform.
Although this theory is aspirational because the United States currently
lacks sufficient political will to adopt all aspects of my theory, I seek to
contribute to the growing momentum for reform 3 40 in several ways. I want
to spark a national dialogue about why changing education federalism
should be included among the education reform conversations. The public
needs to understand the many costs that the United States has paid for its
approach to education federalism. The United States also needs to adopt a
research-driven basis for how education federalism should be restructured
to achieve the nation's education goals. My theory injects the foundational
issue of education federalism and how it must be restructured as a critical
missing element of the ongoing education reform agenda.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A MORE EQUITABLE FUTURE

My theory for reconstructing education federalism envisions the
federal, state, and local governments joining together in a shoulder-toshoulder partnership to build an education system in which all
schoolchildren receive equal access to an excellent education. By
establishing the federal government as the final guarantor of equal
educational opportunity, it offers innovative ways to empower and
incentivize state and local governments to close opportunity and
achievement gaps. It would require the federal government both to
demand much from state and local governments and give much to them.

339. See Kaestle, supra note 41, at 37.
340. See, e.g., WENDY KOPP, A CHANCE TO MAKE HISTORY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T
IN PROVIDING AN EXCELLENT EDUCATION FOR ALL 20748 (2012); QUALITY EDUCATION AS A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT: CREATING A GRASSROOTS MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM PUBLIC SCHOOLS
(Theresa Perry et al. eds., 2010); S. EDUC. FOUND., NO TIME TO LOSE: WHY AMERICA NEEDS AN
EDUCATION AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION TO IMPROVE PUBLIC EDUCATION (2009);
EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supranote 1, at 34-35.
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My theory is particularly timely because it is offered at a time when the
nation has already begun to embrace a historic expansion of the federal
role in education. 34 ' A substantial federal role in education is likely to
continue because it generally enjoys bipartisan support as well as support
from the business community, civil rights groups, and many other
Americans.342 Although support for federal involvement in education has
been growing, the United States has lacked a theory for how this role
should evolve. 34 3 Several scholars and the Equity and Excellence
Commission have offered a variety of proposals for how the federal role in
education should be strengthened to advance equal educational
opportunity. 3 I offer a theory of education federalism that could guide
implementation of such proposals by analyzing how the nation should
improve upon the strengths of federal education policymaking and
identifying critical missing components of an effective reform movement.
Disrupting the nation's longstanding approach to education federalism
and reconstructing it in ways that support the nation's education goals will
be essential to successful education reform. Federal education law and
policy built upon my theory would restructure education federalism in
ways that support closing opportunity gaps. Closing these gaps is essential
to closing achievement gaps and thereby enabling all children to enjoy the
possibilities of the American dream. Research reveals that closing
achievement gaps would both greatly increase the nation's economic
growth and lead to future economic strength and competitiveness of the
U.S. economy.345 As the United States continues to search for new ways to
expand educational opportunity and improve educational quality, my
theory offers some pioneering ideas for moving our national dialogue
away from educational paralysis and toward educational excellence.

341. See McGuINN, supra note 30, at 179, 202; Jacobsen & Saultz, supra note 70, at 384.
&

342. See McGUINN, supra note 30, at 192; REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 147; Jacobsen
Saultz, supra note 70, at 384.
343. See Kaestle, supra note 41, at 17.
344. See, e.g., REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 152-55; EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM'N,

supra note 1, at 34-35; Liu, supranote 3, at 2049; Robinson, supra note 37, at 1715-22.

345. See, e.g., COUNCL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 2, at I ("[T]he real scourge of the
U.S. education system-and its greatest competitive weakness-is the deep and growing achievement

gap between socioeconomic groups that begins early and lasts through a student's academic career....
It is an economist's rule that an increase of one year in a country's average schooling level
corresponds to an increase of 3 to 4 percent in long-term economic growth."); EQUITY & EXCELLENCE
COMM'N, supra note 1, at 13 ("If Hispanic and African American student performance grew to be
comparable to white performance and remained there over the next 80 years, the historical evidence

indicates that the impact would be staggering-adding some $50 trillion (in present value terms) to our
economy.").

